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1. See, e.g., Richard Manning, Org. for Econ. Cooperation & Dev.,
Development Co-operation Report 2005, at 16 tbl.1.1 (2006) (ranking the United States
second to last in 2004 and last in 2006, with an ODA/GNI ratio less than half the
European Union average). In 2004 the United States gave $19.7 billion, or 0.17% of
GNI. Id.
2. See, e.g., Jeffrey D. Sachs, The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities for
Our Time 329, 337-40 (2005) (asserting that questions about solving global poverty are
“particularly American questions these days” and urging the U.S. government to fulfill
its Monterrey Consensus pledge); United Nations Dev. Programme, Human
Development Report 2005, at 86 (2005) (describing the Monterrey Consensus and the
United States’ explicit refusal to “see the 0.7% target as an operational budget
commitment”).
3. Perhaps the most influential work in this vein has been that of Carol
Adelman and her colleagues at the Hudson Institute. See, e.g., Carol C. Adelman et al.,
Hudson Inst., America’s Total Economic Engagement with the Developing World:
Rethinking the Uses and Nature of Foreign Aid (2005), available at
http://www.hudson.org/files/publications/Rethinking_Foreign_Aid.pdf; Hudson Inst.,
The Index of Global Philanthropy 2007 (2007), available at
http://gpr.hudson.org/files/publications/IndexGlobalPhilanthropy2007.pdf; see also U.S.
Agency for Int’l Dev., Foreign Aid in the National Interest: Promoting Freedom,
Security, and Opportunity ch. 6 (2002) (echoing the Hudson Institute’s arguments that
ODA fails to capture “the full measure of foreign aid”); Editorial, Privatize Foreign
Aid?, WALL ST. J., July 7-8, 2007, at A6 (citing Hudson Institute statistics for the
proposition that “[a]ll this generosity [from the private sector] counters the claim the
U.S. isn’t pulling its weight in foreign aid”).
4. Stanley S. Surrey & Paul R. McDaniel, Tax Expenditures 3 (1985).
INTRODUCTION
Few issues in global politics are as contentious as foreign aid – how
much rich countries should give, in what ways, to whom. For years, it has been
a commonplace that U.S. policies are stingy. The Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) routinely ranks the United States far
behind its industrialized peers in official development assistance (ODA),
measured as a percentage of gross national income (GNI).1 An endless parade
of critics has implored the government to do more; some suggest that the Bush
Administration’s support for the Monterrey Consensus, which sets a goal of
increasing assistance to 0.7% of GNI, commits it to do more.2 Against these
allegations of miserliness, executive officials and certain sympathetic scholars
have begun to argue that the published statistics are misleading because they fail
to account for individual and corporate philanthropy. What the OECD misses,
this argument runs, is the exceptional extent of Americans’ private generosity.3
What both sides of the debate have missed, this Article proposes, is not
the role of the private sector in generating foreign aid but the role of tax
expenditures in subsidizing it. Better known as tax breaks or loopholes, tax
expenditures are deviations from the normal tax structure “designed to favor a
particular industry, activity, or class of persons.”4 They take the form of
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5. This is the simplest and most common way to quantify tax expenditure costs,
but it is not the only one. See infra text accompanying notes 69-73 (explaining the
standard methods used for calculating tax expenditures).
6. See infra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
7. Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No.
93-344, § 601(a), 88 Stat. 297, 323 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 1105(a)(16)
(2006)).
deductions, exemptions, exclusions, deferrals, credits, or preferential rates.
Economically, these “expenditures” may be seen as equivalent to direct
government outlays: if U.S. taxpayers saved $70 billion last year from, say, the
mortgage interest deduction, the government therefore gave a $70 billion
(implicit) subsidy to homeownership.5 Stanley Surrey pioneered the theory of
tax expenditures in the late 1960s, and the concept is now widely, though not
universally, credited.6 Since 1974, Congress has required the annual publication
of a tax expenditure budget.7
Although not immediately evident from the budget data, in recent years
a growing amount of expenditure has gone toward foreign aid. The reason lies
in America’s tax treatment of nonprofit organizations. Whenever U.S. charities
and foundations spend money overseas – as they have increasingly been doing
– some portion of this spending can be attributed to the support they receive
from numerous state and federal tax privileges. More controversially, several
other domestic tax expenditures, such as the deferral granted to foreign source
active business income, might also be seen as providing foreign assistance.
Unlike traditional ODA, these tax expenditure funds are privately organized and
distributed, yet unlike voluntary transfers they are paid for by the public fisc.
This is not private aid; it is privatized aid.
The basic, descriptive goal of this Article is to show, in Parts I and II,
how nonprofit tax policies have shaped the content of American aid. This
analysis implies that the definition of ODA should be revised, as the next Part
explains. The broader goal is to begin to connect these insights, in the balance
of Part III, with the literatures on tax expenditures and international
development – and, in so doing, to illuminate some attractive and unattractive
features of using tax expenditures in the foreign aid context. While my focus
throughout is on the United States, the central argument can be generalized to
any country with broadly analogous international tax policies.
I. HIDDEN SOURCES OF AID
Tax expenditures that arguably provide foreign aid fall into two main
buckets: those aimed primarily at the nonprofit sector and those aimed primarily
at the for-profit sector. Section A of this Part describes the former, Section B the
latter.
The idea that U.S. tax policy can serve as a vehicle for fostering
economic development overseas, I should note at the outset, is not a new one.
644 Florida Tax Review [Vol. 8:6
8. See Michael J. Graetz, Taxing International Income: Inadequate Principles,
Outdated Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policies, 54 Tax L. Rev. 261, 273-75 (2001)
(describing these efforts). Most notably, in 1961 the Kennedy Administration proposed
eliminating deferral for all foreign source active business income, except for income
earned by certain corporations in developing countries. See Message from the President
of the United States Relative to Our Federal Tax System, H.R. Doc. No. 87-140, at 6-7,
51-56 (1961). This proposal would have had the obvious effect of making investment
in developing countries relatively more attractive.
9. Robert Hellawell, United States Income Taxation and Less Developed
Countries: A Critical Appraisal, 66 Colum. L. Rev. 1393, 1393-94 (1966). As Professor
Hellawell notes, this “favoritism” had another important purpose: to help develop new
foreign markets for American exports, investments, and other commercial interests. Id.
In this Cold War period, it seems likely that the desire to spread American values and
political influence provided an additional rationale.
More recent examples of scholarship that has made the comparison between
foreign-investment-related tax expenditures and foreign aid include J. Clifton Fleming,
Jr. et al., Fairness in International Taxation: The Ability-to-Pay Case for Taxing
Worldwide Income, 5 Fla. Tax Rev. 299, 344-46 (2001) (arguing on foreign policy
grounds against a general exemption or deferral system as a substitute for direct aid);
Mitchell A. Kane, Risk and Redistribution in Open and Closed Economies, 92 Va. L.
Rev. 867, 927-28 (2006) (considering tax-generated “divergence” in financial risk
across states as a form of implicit foreign aid); Daniel Lubetzky, Incentives for Peace
and Profits: Federal Legislation To Encourage U.S. Enterprises To Invest in Arab-Israeli
Joint Ventures, 15 Mich. J. Int’l L. 405, 419 (1994) (asserting that corporate tax
incentives are more efficient than direct grants in foreign aid); Yoram Margalioth, Tax
Competition, Foreign Direct Investment and Growth: Using the Tax System To Promote
Developing Countries, 23 Va. Tax Rev. 161, 201 (2003) (suggesting that “rich countries
should replace some of their foreign direct aid with an equity-based tax expenditure
policy”); and Robert J. Peroni, Response to Professor McDaniel’s Article, 35 Geo.
Wash. Int’l L. Rev. 297, 297 (2003) (questioning “the wisdom of using the federal
income tax system as a means of providing economic assistance to developing nations”).
10. Cf. David Roodman & Scott Standley, Tax Policies To Promote Private
Charitable Giving in DAC Countries 3 (Ctr. for Global Dev., Working Paper No. 82,
2006), available at http://www.cgdev.org/files/6303_file_WP_82.pdf (“Cross-country
analyses of the impact of tax policy on giving for development . . . are virtually non-
existent. . . . [T]ax policy, as it affects international private giving, is an important yet
largely ignored aspect of aid policy.”).
John F. Kennedy promoted various tax measures to encourage American
enterprise in developing countries early in his administration,8 and Robert
Hellawell was able to write uncontroversially in 1966 about the tax code’s
“favoritism toward investment in less developed countries” as “an important
part of our foreign aid program.”9 President Kennedy, Professor Hellawell, and
many others have debated the propriety and efficacy of tax subsidies designed
to promote foreign investment. Hardly any commentators, however, have
addressed the international development- and welfare-enhancing potential of tax
provisions not designed with commercial investment in mind – the nonprofit
sector provisions discussed in Section A.10 This oversight is curious because
2007] Hidden Foreign Aid 645
11. Manning, supra note 1, at 260.
12. Id. For the most recent list of countries that qualify as ODA recipients, see
Org. for Econ. Cooperation & Dev., DAC List of ODA Recipients,
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/43/51/35832713.pdf (last visited Apr. 12, 2007). The list
comprises all of Africa, most of South America and Central America, and a smattering
of countries in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. A brief discussion of the origins and
evolution of the list may be found at Org. for Econ. Cooperation & Dev., History of
DAC Lists of Aid Recipient Countries, http://www.oecd.org/document/
55/0,2340,en_2649_34447_35832055_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2007).
13. See, e.g., Adelman et al., supra note 3 (questioning the exclusion of private
contributions and remittance payments); U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., supra note 3, ch.
6 (questioning the exclusion of private contributions, remittance payments, and certain
defense expenditures); Richard Posner, Should the United States Provide Foreign Aid?,
The Becker-Posner Blog, Jan. 21, 2007, http://www.becker-posner-
blog.com/archives/2007/01/should_the_unit.html (questioning the exclusion of private
contributions and defense expenditures); see also infra notes 98-107 and accompanying
text (discussing OECD member countries’ debate over counting the value of deductions
for gifts to development organizations).
14. Most importantly, the OECD itself, through its Development Cooperation
Directorate (DAC), collects and publishes the most comprehensive data available on
private cross-border charitable flows. See generally Dev. Cooperation Directorate, Org.
for  Econ.  Coopera t ion  & Dev. ,  Aid from DAC Members ,
http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/dac (last visited Apr. 12, 2007); see also Roodman &
Standley, supra note 10, at 3-10 (describing the DAC’s and other groups’ data collection
initiatives).
these latter expenditures have the better conceptual claim to being aid (on
account of their charitable purpose) and, quite possibly, have had more
profound effects on the life of developing countries.
What should count as “official development assistance” – the most
commonly used measure of foreign aid – or “official assistance” is a contentious
issue. The OECD formula serves as the international benchmark, and I adopt it
as the reference point for my analysis. It defines official assistance as grants,
technical support, or submarket-rate loans in foreign countries that are
“undertaken by the official sector[] with the promotion of economic
development and welfare as the main objective.”11 ODA must satisfy the further
criterion that it goes to lower- or middle-income countries, both of which,
following OECD and World Bank practice, I will refer to throughout as
“developing countries.”12 The OECD definition of aid leaves out all private
spending, including both charitable donations and remittance payments, as well
as all military spending and tax effects. 
Critics have questioned each of these exclusions;13 in this Article, I take
aim only at the last one. Private spending and military spending have functional,
purposive, and expressive characteristics that differentiate them in significant
ways from public nonmilitary spending, and, so long as they are tallied
somewhere – as they are14 – it seems reasonable that they not be considered part
of ODA. By contrast, the tax expenditures discussed below are not tallied
646 Florida Tax Review [Vol. 8:6
15. Tax expenditures, for example, make no appearance in the Hudson
Institute’s latest Index of Global Philanthropy, which purports “to comprehensively
detail the sources and magnitude of private giving to the developing world,” Hudson
Inst., supra note 3, at 3, or in the U.S. Agency for International Development’s leading
report on the subject, which purports to reveal “the full measure of [U.S.] foreign aid,”
U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., supra note 3, at 129.
16. For an early, powerful criticism to this effect, see Boris I. Bittker,
Accounting for Federal “Tax Subsidies” in the National Budget, 22 Nat’l Tax J. 244
(1969). For more recent iterations, see Bruce Bartlett, The End of Tax Expenditures as
We Know Them?, 92 Tax Notes 413 (July 16, 2001); and Douglas A. Kahn & Jeffrey
S. Lehman, Tax Expenditure Budgets: A Critical View, 54 Tax Notes 1661 (Mar. 30,
1992).
17. Significant reconceptualizations include Daniel N. Shaviro, Rethinking Tax
Expenditures and Fiscal Language, 57 Tax L. Rev. 187 (2004) (arguing that tax
expenditures are better defined as allocative rules than as government spending and that
tax expenditure budgeting ought to be more flexible in its classifications); and Victor
Thuronyi, Tax Expenditures: A Reassessment, 1988 Duke L.J. 1155 (proposing
“substitutable tax provisions” as an alternative to the normative tax as a baseline for tax
expenditure analysis).
18. Despite its detractors, the tax expenditure concept has become a widely
accepted tool for tax and budgetary analysis across the world, used by national and sub-
national governments, the OECD, and the World Bank alike. See, e.g., International
Aspects of Tax Expenditures: A Comparative Study 5 (Paul R. McDaniel & Stanley S.
Surrey eds., 1985) [hereinafter International Aspects] (providing a template for
comparative analysis and noting that “[t]he fact that tax and budget experts from
different countries have been able to identify and quantify tax expenditures within their
respective tax systems gives considerable support to the experience of this study group
that there exist broadly shared views as to the elements that constitute a normative
anywhere, nor do they play any discernible role in the foreign aid
conversation.15 They are the one major source of foreign aid that remains truly
hidden. And yet, these tax expenditures approximate much more closely the
activities that people tend to think of as aid: they too represent a form of state
fiscal intervention in the civilian sphere. More so than private spending and
military spending, I would argue, the exclusion of these expenditures from
ODA lacks a principled basis. Either way, they alone are the focus of this
inquiry.
What, if anything, should count as a tax expenditure is also a
contentious issue. Some tax scholars reject the entire notion of tax expenditures
– arguing, for example, that there is no such thing as a value-neutral “normal”
or “normative” tax base from which deviations can be reliably identified and
measured16 – while others would construe these expenditures quite differently
than the mainstream practice.17 I cannot engage with this decades-old debate in
this Article; if you believe that tax expenditures are bogus, you presumably will
not be very interested in the argument here. My hope (and assumption) is that
most readers do not so believe, even if they have some doubts about the precise
nature and proper usage of this concept.18
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income, value added or wealth tax”); Org. for Econ. Cooperation & Dev., Tax
Expenditures: Recent Experiences (1996) [hereinafter OECD Tax Expenditure Report]
(surveying tax expenditure usage and reporting in fourteen OECD countries); World
Bank, Tax Expenditures – Shedding Light on Government Spending Through the Tax
System: Lessons from Developed and Transition Economies (Hana Polackova Brixi et
al. eds., 2004) (examining seven tax expenditure systems and suggesting implications
for developing countries).
19. See John Simon et al., The Federal Tax Treatment of Charitable
Organizations, in The Nonprofit Sector: A Research Handbook 267, 267 (Walter W.
Powell & Richard Steinberg eds., 2d ed. 2006).
20. Exempt organizations must pay taxes on their unrelated business income
(UBIT), IRC § 511 (2006), but commentators have frequently suggested that the UBIT
rules permit broad underreporting and are structurally more generous than the rules
faced by for-profit competitors. See Evelyn Brody, Charities in Tax Reform: Threats to
Subsidies Overt and Covert, 66 Tenn. L. Rev. 687, 702-03 (1999); Ethan Stone,
Adhering to the Old Line: Uncovering the History and Political Function of the
Unrelated Business Income Tax, 54 Emory L.J. 1475, 1494-97 (2005).
21. Nonprofit organizations also receive many lesser tax privileges. For a
thorough discussion of their tax treatment, see generally James J. Fishman & Stephen
Schwarz, Nonprofit Organizations: Cases and Materials pts. 3-4 (3d ed. 2006); and Bazil
Facchina et al., Privileges and Exemptions Enjoyed by Nonprofit Organizations, 28
U.S.F. L. Rev. 85 (1993).
22. See, e.g., Staff of Joint Comm. on Taxation, 109th Cong., Estimates of
Federal Tax Expenditures for Fiscal Years 2006-10, at 7-8 (Comm. Print 2006); Office
of Mgmt. & Budget, Analytical Perspectives: Budget of the United States Government,
Fiscal Year 2008, at 287-90 tbl.19-1 (2007).
A. Nonprofit Tax Expenditures
No other tax system is as generous to its nonprofit organizations as that
of the United States;19 U.S. nonprofit law is, in large measure, a coordinated
regime of tax privileges. Many nonprofits are exempt from income, property,
sales, and franchise taxes at all levels of government.20 Contributions to
charities may be deductible under state and federal income, gift, and estate
taxes. Section 501(c)(3) nonprofits are allowed to issue tax-exempt bonds.21
Not everyone agrees that these tax privileges constitute tax
expenditures. The Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) and the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB), for example, include the charitable
contributions deduction but not the income tax exemption in their annual tax
expenditure compilations.22 Because of the special nature of charitable giving
and nonprofit enterprise, one might view the forgone revenue from these
provisions as a necessary concession to measurement difficulties, donor equity,
or the conceptual integrity of the tax base. Among tax scholars, however, it is
common to view both the deduction and the exemption as tax expenditures – as
648 Florida Tax Review [Vol. 8:6
23. See Fishman & Schwarz, supra note 21, at 329 (“Under traditional theory,
tax exemptions and charitable deductions are viewed as government subsidies to the
organizations and their donors.”); Developments in the Law – Nonprofit Corporations,
105 Harv. L. Rev. 1578, 1620 (1992) (“The subsidy theory is the traditional rationale
for the [nonprofit] tax exemption.”); see also Surrey & McDaniel, supra note 4, at 220
(arguing that the “omission [of the nonprofit income tax exemption] from the U.S. tax
expenditure lists is a serious one and should be rectified”).
24. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 591 (1983) (“When
the Government grants exemptions or allows deductions all taxpayers are affected; the
very fact of the exemption or deduction for the donor means that other taxpayers can be
said to be indirect and vicarious ‘donors.’”); Regan v. Taxation with Representation of
Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 544 (1983) (“Both tax exemptions and tax deductibility are a form
of subsidy that is administered through the tax system.”). But see Walz v. Tax Comm’n,
397 U.S. 664, 675 (1970) (distinguishing between a “direct money subsidy” and a grant
of tax-exempt status for creating government involvement in religion).
25. See Brody, supra note 20, at 691 n.5; John D. Colombo, The Marketing of
Philanthropy and the Charitable Contributions Deduction: Integrating Theories for the
Deduction and Tax Exemption, 36 Wake Forest L. Rev. 657, 682 (2001). But see
William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 Harv. L. Rev.
309, 344-75 (1972) (disputing this characterization).
26 This is the OECD’s definition of ODA. See supra notes 11-12 and
accompanying text.
27. If it helps to put this claim in algebraic terms, here is how Burt Weisbrod
has explained it with respect to the charitable deduction:
[W]ith tax-deductible donations, whether for domestic or foreign
purposes, a donation by person X of $Y to organization Z has the
following direct effects: (1) Z receives $Y, (2) person X gives up
$Y(1-t) – where t = X’s marginal income tax rate, and (3) all other
members of society, as a whole, give up $Y(t). I believe your point,
with which I agree, is that when t > 0, society (the “public”) is a
contributor. When the foreign aid is directly from government, t = 1;
if, on average, private donations are deductible at a marginal rate of,
say, 0.3, then society as a whole, excluding person X, pays 0.3 times
government subsidies justifiable, if at all, on consequentialist grounds.23 The
Supreme Court seems to concur.24 Almost everyone who believes in the
existence of tax expenditures believes that the charitable deduction is one.25
This is significant because, as we will see in the following Part, it is this
provision above all others that accounts for hidden foreign aid.
If one acknowledges the nonprofit tax preferences (or some subset
thereof) to be tax expenditures, it follows that the government acts as an indirect
fiscal sponsor of the beneficiary organizations, in all that they do. When the
organizations expend funds on grants, technical support, or submarket-rate
loans in developing countries “with the promotion of economic development
and welfare as the main objective,”26 it is hard to see why, analytically, the tax
expenditure portion of these funds – the portion effectively paid for by the
government – should not count as ODA.27
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the donation by person X. In short, using these illustrative numbers,
$1 of governmental aid plus $1 of private donations = $1.30 of
“public” aid.
E-mail from Burton Weisbrod, John Evans Professor of Economics, Northwestern
University, to David Pozen (Dec. 14, 2006) (on file with author).
It might be objected that even if the promotion of economic development and
welfare abroad is the main objective of these nonprofit organizations, it is not the main
objective of the U.S. government, and the latter’s motives are what matters under the
OECD definition. This objection seems like splitting hairs, though. The U.S.
government places no geographic restrictions on the property and income tax
exemptions or the gift and estate tax deductions, and it allows full deductibility for
cross-border gifts under the income tax so long as the gifts pass through a domestic
intermediary. See David E. Pozen, Remapping the Charitable Deduction, 39 Conn. L.
Rev. 531, 537-42 (2006) (summarizing these rules). These rules put the United States
toward the more internationalist end of the spectrum in the generosity of its tax policies
affecting foreign giving. See Anthony C. Infanti, Spontaneous Tax Coordination: On
Adopting a Comparative Approach To Reforming the U.S. International Tax Regime,
35 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 1105, 1223-26 (2002); Pozen, supra, at 546 n.67, 594. Surely
a central objective of this policy regime is to support the work that the recipient charities
do across the globe.
28. IRC § 170(c)(2)(A). Under the gift and estate taxes, these geographic
restrictions do not apply. Id. §§ 2055, 2522.
29. See Curt Tarnoff & Larry Nowels, Cong. Research Serv., Foreign Aid: An
Introductory Overview of U.S. Programs and Policy 26 (2004); U.S. Agency for Int’l
Dev., supra note 3, at 140-41.
With the charitable deduction, the foreign aid subsidy occurs any time
individuals or corporations make contributions to a U.S.-based nonprofit that
runs or supports appropriate programs outside the country. Federal income tax
deductions are not available for gifts made directly to foreign recipients, but the
rules allow full deductibility for gifts made through an American intermediary.28
With the various entity-level exemptions, the foreign aid subsidy can occur
whenever a U.S.-based organization sends abroad money it would have
otherwise lost to taxes. 
Many private individuals and organizations contribute to international
development causes without regard for tax incentives, and the federal
government often uses private contractors to implement its aid programs29 –
phenomena that have both been referred to as the “privatization of foreign aid”
– but tax expenditures are different in that the first phenomenon, on the one
hand, does not deprive the government of revenue it would have otherwise
collected, while the second phenomenon, on the other hand, involves explicit
state action. The charitable tax expenditures have a governmental source, one
might say, but they never flow through any governmental entity. They are more
public than unsubsidized private spending, but less public than conventional
government spending.
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30. Murray S. Weitzman et al., The New Nonprofit Almanac and Desk
Reference 133 tbl.5.4 (2002).
31. Janelle A. Kerlin & Supaporn Thanasombat, Urban Inst., The International
Charitable Nonprofit Subsector: Scope, Size, and Revenue 1, 6 (2006), available at
http://urban.org/UploadedPDF/311360_nonprofit_subsector.pdf. As of 2003, the median
age of these internationally focused organizations was only seven years. Elizabeth J.
Reid & Janelle A. Kerlin, Urban Inst., The International Charitable Nonprofit Subsector
in the United States: International Understanding, International Development and
Assistance, and International Affairs 10 tbl.2 (2006), available at
http://urban.org/UploadedPDF/411276_nonprofit_subsector.pdf.
32. Loren Renz & Josie Atienza, Found. Ctr., International Grantmaking
Update: A Snapshot of U.S. Foundation Trends 7 (2006), available at
http://foundationcenter.org/gainknowledge/research/pdf/intl_update_2006.pdf. The
Foundation Center reports that international gifts represented 18% of overall giving by
U.S. foundations in terms of grant dollars and 8% in terms of number of grants in 2004,
up from 5% on both measures in 1982. Id. at 2. In a recent study on the role of
foundations in international development work, the OECD observed that “United States
foundations are by far the most important in the development field,” owing to their size
and experience. Dev. Assistance Comm., Org. for Econ. Cooperation & Dev.,
Philanthropic Foundations and Development Co-operation 30 (2003); see also id. at 49
tbl.1 & 52 tbl.3 (indicating that international giving by U.S. foundations grew from $0.8
billion in 1990 to $3.1 billion in 2000, with approximately 30% of the 2000 amount
attributable to the Gates Foundation). For a detailed discussion of U.S. tax laws that bear
on foundations’ international philanthropy, see Nina J. Crimm, Through a Post-
September 11 Looking Glass: Assessing the Roles of Federal Tax Laws and Tax
Policies Applicable to Global Philanthropy by Private Foundations and Their Donors,
23 Va. Tax Rev. 1 (2003).
33. See Pozen, supra note 27, at 568-70 (describing the growing international
role of U.S. charities, foundations, and donors and providing further statistics).
As the U.S. nonprofit sector has grown larger and more international,
it stands to reason that tax expenditures on foreign aid have swelled
correspondingly. Of the 2,078 public charities classified by the IRS in 1998 as
“international and foreign affairs” entities, 88% were founded in 1970 or later
and 62% were founded in 1985 or later.30 Internationally focused charities and
foundations currently make up about 2% of the nonprofit sector, in numerical
and revenue terms, and this figure is expected to rise.31 Warren Buffett’s recent
$31 billion pledge to the Gates Foundation in itself ensures that “international
[foundation] giving can be expected to grow at a healthy pace” over the next
decade.32 Many of the domestically focused organizations, moreover, have
expanding overseas roles.33 These trends reflect a distinctive feature of tax
expenditures as compared to direct expenditures: once the triggering tax
preference is established, the expenditure becomes a function of exogenous
factors and can grow or shrink dramatically without any government action.
2007] Hidden Foreign Aid 651
34. See Tarnoff & Nowels, supra note 29, at 15 figs.7 & 8, 30-31 tbl.5
(charting the decline in official aid in real dollars and as a percentage of GDP).
35. Staff of Joint Comm. on Taxation, supra note 22, at 30 tbl.1; Office of
Mgmt. & Budget, supra note 22, at 287 tbl.19-1. The Treasury report provides a brief
explanation of these expenditures in Office of Mgmt. & Budget, supra note 22, at 300.
The extraterritorial income exclusion was repealed in 2004 but remains partly in place
for a transitional period. Id. The exclusion of foreign earned income, it bears noting,
may benefit nonprofit organizations (foreign as well as domestic) that employ U.S.
citizens abroad. I omitted this provision from the previous Section because it is in no
way aimed at the nonprofit sector.
36. IRC § 901, 904.
37. Michael J. Graetz, Foundations of International Income Taxation 157
(2003). Professor Graetz provides a detailed overview of the foreign tax credit in id. ch.
4.
38. See, e.g., Surrey & McDaniel, supra note 4, at 162; Russell K. Osgood, The
Ages and Themes of Income Taxation: Savings and Investment, 68 Cornell L. Rev. 521,
525 (1983); Robert J. Peroni, A Hitchhiker’s Guide to Reform of the Foreign Tax Credit
Limitation, 56 SMU L. Rev. 391, 391 (2003); Thuronyi, supra note 17, at 1164 n.55.
Capital export neutrality refers to the principle that resident taxpayers should be made
Indeed, the recent growth in America’s tax expenditure aid cuts in the opposite
direction of its post-Marshall Plan secular decline in official aid.34
B. Other Tax Expenditures
Beyond the nonprofit sector tax privileges, a number of other tax
expenditures might have a claim to providing hidden foreign aid. An obvious
place to start looking is the list of tax expenditures in the “International Affairs”
section of the JCT and OMB budgets: the exclusion of income earned abroad
by U.S. citizens, the exclusion of certain allowances for federal employees
abroad, the exclusion of extraterritorial income, the deferral of active income
of controlled foreign corporations, the deferral of certain active financing
income, and the inventory property sales source rule exception.35 All of these
tax expenditures generate extraterritorial economic benefits by making it more
likely that American citizens and companies will want to earn income in foreign
countries and to keep it there.
Not included in the list of International Affairs tax expenditures is the
foreign tax credit36 – “the cornerstone of U.S. international tax policy” for
nearly a century37 – though some have argued that it deserves a place. The
foreign tax credit encompasses a complex web of rules, but its basic function
is to allow U.S. residents a credit against their income tax bill for the income
taxes they have already paid to a foreign source country. Most tax scholars
see this provision not as a tax expenditure designed to incentivize foreign
source income-earning activities, but rather as a mechanism for avoiding
double taxation and thereby safeguarding the structure of the normative tax
base and accommodating the goal of capital export neutrality.38 The desire
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to feel indifferent, economically, between domestic and foreign investments providing
the same pretax expected rate of return. It is thought by many to be essential for
worldwide economic efficiency.
39. See Michael J. Graetz & Michael M. O’Hear, The “Original Intent” of U.S.
International Taxation, 46 Duke L.J. 1021, 1043-54 (1997) (explaining the arguments
and aims of T.S. Adams, the key champion of the early legislation). A concern to
promote international trade and to help rebuild Europe after World War I, Graetz and
O’Hear indicate, also contributed to the passage of the foreign tax credit. Id. at 1049-53.
40. See id. at 1045 (“The FTC represented what was an extraordinarily
generous measure for its time: the United States was assuming sole responsibility for
the costs of reducing the double taxation of its residents and citizens.”).
41. Although a staunch critic of the tax expenditure concept, Boris Bittker once
suggested this line of argument. See Bittker, supra note 16, at 250 n.15. A deduction
would be less generous than a credit because it would limit tax relief to the foreign taxes
paid, multiplied by the taxpayer’s domestic marginal tax rate. Treasury has
acknowledged that, under some views, the revenue loss generated by use of foreign tax
credits instead of mere deductions might be considered a tax expenditure, see, e.g.,
Office of Mgmt. & Budget, supra note 22, at 316, but it has never, to my knowledge,
included any such item in an official tax expenditure list.
42. See Graetz, supra note 37, at 157-58 (explaining the distinction between
a deduction, credit, and exemption system for foreign source income taxes). In practice,
however, it may be the case that low source-country tax rates or lengthy deferral periods
often lead the foreign tax credit to function like an exemption. See Hugh Ault et al.,
Comparative Income Taxation: A Structural Analysis 381 (1997); Graetz & O’Hear,
supra note 39, at 1064-65. 
43. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text (explaining the OECD’s
definition of ODA).
to avoid double taxation, Michael Graetz and Michael O’Hear have shown,
was the animating goal behind the introduction of the foreign tax credit in
191839 – a time when no other countries offered similar tax relief.40 Some
commentators have argued that the foreign tax credit should be considered
a tax expenditure, at least in part, because there are other means to prevent
double taxation that would be less generous to the resident taxpayer, namely
a deduction for source-country taxes.41 (Note, though, that there are also
means that would be more generous: exempting source-country income from
U.S. taxation altogether.)42 Notwithstanding this line of dissent, I will follow
mainstream practice in this Article and decline to count the foreign tax credit
as a tax expenditure.
However one construes the aforementioned provisions, it is not clear
that any of them meet the ODA requirement of having as their main objective
the promotion of economic development and welfare abroad.43 The drafters
of these provisions and the authorizing Congresses may have had this
objective in mind, but they plainly sought to pursue other goals as well: the
economic goal of helping U.S. multinational companies develop foreign
markets and the geopolitical goal of spreading American influence. As
Daniel Shaviro remarks in a recent paper, the idea that U.S. tax policy
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44. Daniel Shaviro, Why Worldwide Welfare as a Normative Standard in U.S.
Tax Policy?, 60 Tax L. Rev. (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 3, available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=966256). Professor Shaviro goes on to argue that worldwide
welfare, in the guise of capital export neutrality or capital import neutrality, is not truly
the motivating norm behind U.S. international tax policy, but rather, “CEN and CIN are
in fact tools for promoting national welfare in the broader setting of a global prisoner’s
dilemma.” Id. at 35. 
45. See supra note 8; Robert F. Hudson, Jr. & Gregg D. Lemein, U.S. Tax
Planning for U.S. Companies Doing Business in Latin America, 27 U. Miami Inter-Am.
L. Rev. 233, 241 (1995). Professor Karen Brown has recently tried to revive a variation
on this proposal, in which the United States would exempt, rather than merely allow
deferral of, all foreign source income earned in developing countries. See Karen B.
Brown, Missing Africa: Should U.S. International Tax Rules Accommodate Investment
in Developing Countries?, 23 U. Pa. J. Int’l Econ. L. 45 (2002).
46. See Graetz, supra note 37, at 25, 245. Such lobbying is a good sign that the
provision functions as a tax expenditure. For a vigorous critique of this deferral on
fairness and efficiency grounds, see Robert J. Peroni, Back to the Future: A Path to
Progressive Reform of the U.S. International Income Tax Rules, 51 U. Miami L. Rev.
975, 986-89 (1997).
47. Cf. Kane, supra note 9, at 927 n.97 (“Most, perhaps almost all, foreign aid
from the outset has been understood as bringing to the United States some type of quid
pro quo, ranging from containing communism in the years after World War II to
fighting terrorism today.”) (citing Tarnoff & Nowels, supra note 29, at 1 & n.1); Posner,
supra note 13 (“Of course we do not [serve as the “world’s policeman”] from the
goodness of our heart, but to protect our national security – but then very little that
government does is motivated by altruism toward foreigners.”).
regarding outbound investment was not fashioned to advance the interests of
the American people “begs credulity.”44 When President Kennedy proposed
on humanitarian grounds that the United States limit to developing countries
the deferral of foreign source active business income – by far the largest of
these tax expenditures, in terms of fiscal impact – Congress rejected his
proposal.45 The U.S. business community has for years vigorously opposed
efforts to eliminate or reduce this deferral;46 surely this lobbying effort
reflects the companies’ concern for their bottom line, not some turn to global
altruism.
Many other tax expenditures may benefit multinational corporations
in some way (for example, the exclusions allowed for employer pension
plans and employer contributions to medical insurance) or otherwise yield
benefits for the world beyond our borders (for example, tax subsidies for the
development of clean energy technologies). Should these expenditures also
be counted as “foreign aid”? The idea would offend most people’s intuitions
about aid and risk diluting the concept beyond recognition. Perhaps nothing
the government does is ever purely altruistic47 – perhaps nothing anyone does
is ever thus – but as compared to the nonprofit sector tax expenditures, the
International Affairs expenditures seem to reflect a mix of altruistic and self-
interested motive much more skewed toward the latter. In a globalized world,
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48. Paul R. McDaniel, The U.S. Tax Treatment of Foreign Source Income
Earned in Developing Countries: A Policy Analysis, 35 Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. 265,
265 (2003) (citing Bureau of Economic Analysis statistics).
49. See Allison D. Christians, Tax Treaties for Investment and Aid to Sub-
Saharan Africa, 71 Brook. L. Rev. 639, 700-01 (2005) (discussing recent findings that
multinational firms “can use debt financing and transfer pricing manipulation to achieve
tax neutrality in investment location decisions” and that “non-tax factors dominate
[these firms’] location decisions”); McDaniel, supra note 48, at 279-85 (summarizing
the empirical literature on the determinants of FDI). Professor McDaniel has expressed
skepticism that even reforms aimed specifically at increasing FDI in developing
countries – for example, allowing an exemption for or imposing a lower corporate tax
rate on income earned there – would achieve the desired results. McDaniel, supra note
48, at 285-95.
Recent empirical research suggests that once U.S. multinationals have decided
to invest abroad, source-country tax policies may be more significant than residence-
country policies in determining the allocation of FDI. See, e.g., Mihir A. Desai et al.,
Foreign Direct Investment in a World of Multiple Taxes, 88 J. Pub. Econ. 2727 (2004);
Michael P. Devereaux & Harold Freeman, The Impact of Tax on Foreign Direct
Investment: Empirical Evidence and the Implications for Tax Integration Schemes, 2
Int’l Tax & Pub. Fin. 85 (1995); James R. Hines, Tax Policy and Activities of
Multinational Corporations, in Fiscal Policy: Lessons from Academic Research 401
(Alan Auerbach ed., 1997). The international community, however, has largely
condemned developing countries’ efforts to lure FDI through tax concessions, seeing
these policies as distortionary for investment decisions and, ultimately, as
counterproductive. See McDaniel, supra note 48, at 283-84 (noting that the OECD, the
International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the World Trade Organization, and the
United Nations, along with many economists, are all on record as opposing such
concessions).
50. See Christians, supra note 49, at 684.
few tax policies will have no economic consequences for other countries.
That does not mean that the entire Code can be fruitfully assessed under the
rubric of aid.
Even if, among those tax expenditures not related to the nonprofit
sector, the International Affairs group has the strongest – if still fairly weak
– conceptual claim to providing foreign aid, it is not necessarily the case that
these expenditures actually help developing countries. For one thing, very
little U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) makes its way to developing
countries: out of more than $6 trillion in U.S.-owner assets earned abroad in
2001, Paul McDaniel reports, only $16 billion or so was earned in Africa and
$114 billion in the developing countries of Asia.48 In addition, commentators
have suggested that income tax incentives offered by wealthy governments
may not do much to stimulate FDI in developing countries,49 and that our
deferral of foreign source active business income may lead these countries
into harmful tax competition by increasing the sensitivity of U.S. taxpayers
to foreign rates.50 To the extent that host-country tax expenditures do
stimulate FDI, some commentators have also expressed skepticism that this
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51. See Dirk Willem te Velde, Overseas Dev. Inst., Policies Towards Foreign
Direct Investment in Developing Countries: Emerging Best-Practices and Outstanding
Issues 6-7 (2001), http://www.odi.org.uk/IEDG/FDI_Conference/DWPaper.pdf
(synopsizing arguments in the literature that FDI can lead to income inequality, reduced
environmental and labor standards, erosion of the tax base, and crowding out of local
capabilities).
52. The classic account of foreign aid as ineffectual, if not perverse, is William
Easterly, The Elusive Quest for Growth: Economists’ Adventures and Misadventures
in the Tropics (2001). Easterly’s analysis and prescriptions remain deeply contested in
the development community. See, e.g., Jeffrey D. Sachs, Up from Poverty, Wash. Post,
Mar. 27, 2005, at BW12 (calling Easterly a “notorious . . . cheerleader for ‘can’t-do’
economics” whose “simplistic approach fits well with many conservatives in
Washington, who would rather blame the poor than help them”).
53. From its title, the orphan drug credit might sound like a promising
candidate, but by its terms it will only subsidize research into rare diseases or conditions
afflicting persons “in the United States.” IRC § 45C(d) (2006). For those who would
prefer to count some portion of the defense budget as aid, see supra notes 13-14 and
accompanying text (explaining, and bracketing, this argument), all of the tax
expenditures targeted at the military – the exclusion of benefits and allowances to armed
forces personnel; the exclusions of veterans’ death benefits, disability compensation,
pensions, and housing bond interest; and the like – might also have a claim to providing
hidden foreign aid.
54. See Christians, supra note 49, at 664, 673-78 (explaining these concessions
and citing to U.S. treaties into which they are incorporated); Philip R. West, Int’l Tax
Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Testimony to the Senate Comm. on Foreign
Relations (Oct. 27, 1999), available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/ls177.htm
(observing, in a discussion of a proposed tax treaty with Venezuela, that “[a]lthough the
withholding rates under the proposed treaty are generally higher than those in the U.S.
Model, the rates are comparable to those found in other U.S. tax treaties with developing
countries”); see also International Aspects, supra note 18, at 149 (asserting that
preferential tax treatment by treaty should be considered a tax expenditure).
investment truly benefits the developing country recipients51 – a kind of
leftist analogue to the perverse-consequences arguments that some, mostly
politically conservative, writers have leveled against (official) foreign aid.52
These views remain largely on the contrarian fringe, however, and I will
assume in this Article that both FDI and foreign aid do more good than harm
for the developing countries that receive them.
Separate from the International Affairs list, there is one other main
type of U.S. tax expenditure that seems to me to have a colorable claim to
providing hidden foreign aid: concessions in tax treaties with developing
countries.53 These treaty concessions may take a variety of forms, but as a
rule they are provisions that surrender greater-than-usual amounts of U.S.
residence-based taxing jurisdiction in favor of broader source-country
taxation.54 The United Nations model tax treaty incorporates such
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55. The very first sentence of the U.N. model treaty refers to the “desirability
of promoting greater inflows of foreign investment to developing countries,” and the
Introduction later acknowledges that the treaty “gives more weight to the source
principle than does the OECD Model Convention.” United Nations Dep’t of Econ. &
Soc. Aff., United Nations Model Double Taxation Convention Between Developed and
Developing Countries ¶¶ 1, 17, at vi, xiv (2001), available at http://unpan1.org/intradoc/
groups/un/unpan002084.pdf.
56. See Deborah Toaze, Tax Sparing: Good Intentions, Unintended Results,
49 Can. Tax J. 879, 880, 883-88 (2001) (explaining tax sparing credits and the United
States’ longstanding refusal to apply them). Tax sparing is a term for policies that
“prevent[] residence-country taxation of income exempted from tax by source countries,
by providing that if a source country refrains from taxing income derived in its
jurisdiction (usually pursuant to a tax holiday), the residence country nevertheless grants
a tax credit for the nominally imposed tax.” Christians, supra note 49, at 692-93
(internal citation omitted). It is typically promoted as a means to encourage foreign
investment in developing countries, but the critical tide seems to have turned toward the
U.S. position; many now see tax sparing as irrelevant, or even detrimental, to the
economic well-being of the intended beneficiaries. See generally Org. for Econ.
Cooperation & Dev., Tax Sparing: A Reconsideration (1998); Christians, supra note 49,
at 692-95; Toaze, supra, at 914.
57. See Christians, supra note 49, at 673 & n.135.
58. Consider, for example, Staff of Joint Comm. on Taxation, 108th Cong.,
Explanation of Proposed Income Tax Treaty Between the United States and the
Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka (Comm. Print 2004). In this background
paper, JCT staff devote several pages to a discussion of the “developing-country
concessions” that appear in the proposed tax treaty with Sri Lanka. Id. at 64-66. The
authors candidly acknowledge that in several respects “the proposed treaty allows higher
rates of source-country tax than the U.S. model allows,” id. at 65, and that “[t]here is a
risk that the inclusion of these concessions . . . could result in additional pressure on the
United States to include such concessions in future treaties negotiated with developing
countries,” id. at 66. Yet nowhere do the authors cite a desire to help Sri Lanka as a
motivation for these concessions. Instead, they argue that concessions “arguably are
necessary in order to conclude tax treaties with developing countries” and that, even
with these concessions, such treaties “can be in the interest of the United States because
they provide reductions in the taxation by [developing] countries of U.S. investors and
a clearer framework for the taxation of U.S. investors,” as well as dispute-resolution
mechanisms, nondiscrimination rules, and information-exchange procedures that
likewise benefit U.S. investors. Id.; see also id. at 2 (explaining the treaty’s overall
purpose in similar terms).
59. See supra note 56.
concessions,55 and while the United States has long declined to include tax
sparing provisions in any of its tax treaties,56 it has applied less explicit
concessions numerous times in recent decades.57
What motivates these concessions, however, appears to be economic
self-interest as much as anything else.58 It therefore seems more reasonable
to view them as bilateral contract terms, rather than as unilateral acts of
largesse. Some tax sparing provisions may look more like the latter, but the
United States, again, categorically refuses to use them, and their efficacy has
been sharply challenged in recent years.59 Moreover, as of 2005, the United
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60. Christians, supra note 49, at 640 n.4.
61. See id. at 666-712 (using Ghana as a case study in expounding this
argument); supra note 56 (discussing the growing disillusionment with tax sparing); see
also S.M.S. Shah & J.F.J. Toye, Fiscal Incentives for Firms in Some Developing
Countries: Survey and Critique, in Taxation and Economic Development: Twelve
Critical Studies 269, 285 (J.F.J. Toye ed., 1978) (asserting that, irrespective of the
formal international tax policy regime, powerful foreign firms can often extract their
own tax concessions from developing country governments).
States only had in place sixteen tax treaties with developing countries.60 As
with the International Affairs tax expenditures, the efficacy of treaty
concessions has also been called into question. Given the dramatic global
disparities in infrastructure, labor force skill level, and purchasing power; the
tax incentives that the Code already provides for foreign investment; and the
low average tax rates applied in most of the developing world, some scholars
have argued that new treaties and new concessions would do little to
stimulate additional trade or investment in the poorest countries.61
* * *
The discussion in this Section has explored a number of tax
expenditures not aimed at the nonprofit sector that might plausibly be
understood as a type of foreign assistance. Despite the good they may do in
developing countries, I conclude that these tax expenditures should not
qualify as aid (as defined by the OECD) because they lack the requisite
degree of other-regarding motive. My primary focus from here on out,
accordingly, will remain on the nonprofit sector tax expenditures. 
II. ESTIMATING THE EXPENSE
So how much does the United States “spend” in tax expenditures on
foreign aid? Separate from the question of which tax expenditures should
qualify as potential sources of aid, there are numerous obstacles, practical
and theoretical, to divining a reliable figure. Subsection A.1 of this Part
identifies six such obstacles, while Subsection A.2 addresses the deeper
concern that it might be unhelpful or inappropriate to compare the tax
expenditures of high-tax and low-tax jurisdictions. Section B takes a stab at
quantifying the amount of hidden U.S. aid.
A. Caveats
1. Measurement Issues
Even if one accepts the argument that some tax expenditures can and
should be counted as foreign aid, it is no easy matter to derive an estimate of
the expense. The first and most basic stumbling block is the aforementioned
debate about which tax preferences (if any) should count as tax
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62. See supra text accompanying notes 16-18, 22-25, 36-42.
63. See Christopher Howard, Tax Expenditures, in The Tools of Government:
A Guide to the New Governance 410, 420 (Lester M. Salamon ed., 2002). As of May
2002, the Tax Policy Center counted twenty-three states that produce tax expenditure
reports. Tax Pol’y Ctr., Tax Facts: State Tax Expenditure Reports (2002),
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxfacts/state/statelinks.cfm.
64. I believe that virtually none of the tax expenditures aimed at foreign
commercial investment should count as aid, see supra Section I.B, but I include for-
profit activity in this discussion for those who would disagree. 
65. Colleges and universities, for instance, likely capture at least some of the
value of students’ tuition credits. See Brody, supra note 20, at 695. Many nonprofits, of
course, also benefit substantially from direct government expenditures and nontax legal
policies.
66. For a forceful critique of tied aid as exploitative and inefficient, see United
Nations Dev. Programme, supra note 2, at 8-9, 76-77, 102-03.
expenditures.62 Some amount of agreement on this issue is a necessary
precondition for any figure to be viewed as legitimate.
Second, those who want to count sub-national tax expenditures may
find the relevant information hard to come by. Many U.S. states do not
produce tax expenditure estimates, and when they do, their methodologies
often differ.63
Third, not all of American organizations’ cross-border activity can
reasonably claim to be foreign aid.64 Some corporate projects – for instance,
projects that hire few locals, lack technological and knowledge spillovers, or
extract precious resources at concessionary terms – may do little to foster
economic development. Some nonprofit projects support religious or cultural
causes, or causes in other wealthy countries, that would not satisfy most
people’s understanding of “aid.” Separating out the tax expenditure allocated
to these activities from the expenditure allocated to true foreign aid activities
would require difficult definitional choices, extensive recordkeeping, and
fine-grained quantitative analysis.
Those who would take a functional approach to measuring tax
expenditure aid – including all spending that ultimately serves an aid-related
end, irrespective of the spending’s underlying rationale – would find these
allocative classifications even more challenging. Many nonprofit
organizations benefit indirectly from a wide range of tax expenditures
beyond the charitable deduction, debt-financing exclusion, and standard
exemptions.65 Many multinational companies and foreign investors likewise
benefit to some degree from a broad patchwork of tax expenditures. The aid
contribution of all these expenditures would also need to be tabulated. 
Fourth, there is the issue of aid quality. Should aid figures be
weighted in some way to reflect their efficacy or other features? For
example, should “tied aid” – aid that comes with the condition that recipients
must spend it on the donor country’s own goods rather than shop around for
the lowest price – be taken at a discount?66 The Center for Global
Development, in the aid component of its Commitment to Development
Index, penalizes donor countries for giving assistance to corrupt
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67. See David Roodman, An Index of Donor Performance (Ctr. for Global
Dev., Working Paper No. 67, 2005), available at http://www.cgdev.org/files/3646_file_
WP67nov.pdf.
68. See, e.g., Jeffrey D. Sachs, The Development Challenge, Foreign Aff.,
Mar.-Apr. 2005, at 78, 82.
69. See OECD Tax Expenditure Report, supra note 18, at 14; Zhicheng Li
Swift et al., Tax Expenditures: General Concept, Measurement, and Overview of
Country Practices, in World Bank, supra note 18, at 1, 7-8.
70. See OECD Tax Expenditure Report, supra note 18, at 14.
71. See, e.g., Office of Mgmt. & Budget, supra note 22, at 286; see also OECD
Tax Expenditure Report, supra note 18, at 14 (identifying the United States as the only
OECD country surveyed in 1996 to use the outlay equivalent method). Julie Roin
provides a brief discussion of the evolution in Treasury’s methods for counting tax
expenditures in Julie Roin, Truth in Government: Beyond the Tax Expenditure Budget,
54 Hastings L.J. 603, 609-10 (2003).
72. See Pozen, supra note 27, at 556-57 (summarizing these studies). I am not
aware of any empirical research that tries to estimate donor tax-price elasticities
specifically for international giving, but it seems plausible that these too exceed 1.0 (in
absolute value) on average. See id. at 574, 580.
governments, overburdening recipients with lots of small projects, and tying
aid.67 The influential economist Jeffrey Sachs has argued that the most
important type of foreign assistance focuses on “transformational
development,” on facilitating long-term infrastructure building as opposed
to emergency relief, technical cooperation, or debt forgiveness.68 Should
transformational development aid be taken at a premium? An ideal measure
of tax expenditures on foreign aid might well control for quality and impact
along these lines. But for whatever it might add in richness and robustness,
making any such adjustments would introduce a highly contestable
qualitative element into the figures and vastly increase the informational
demands of the enterprise.
Fifth, there are several different ways in which the expense of a tax
expenditure might be counted. Revenue forgone is an ex post measure of the
loss in government revenue induced by a particular provision, ignoring
possible behavioral effects. Revenue gain is an ex ante measure of the
increase in revenue expected from repeal of the provision, taking into
account behavioral considerations. Outlay equivalent is the cost of providing
the same monetary benefit to taxpayers through direct spending, assuming,
as with revenue forgone, that behavior is unchanged.69 Virtually every
country that estimates tax expenditures uses the revenue forgone method;70
the United States is notable in that its Treasury also provides outlay
equivalent estimates and present value estimates for certain deferrals.71 With
the charitable deduction, revenue forgone may be expected to lag outlay
equivalent if donor tax-price elasticities exceed 1.0 in absolute value, as
many studies have suggested they do.72 These findings imply that charitable
deductions stimulate more in donations than they consume in tax revenue.
Just having a deduction, it seems, leads people to give in excess of the
monetary discount they receive.
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73. OECD Tax Expenditure Report, supra note 18, at 14.
74. See, e.g., Office of Mgmt. & Budget, supra note 22, at 286. This has not
stopped many tax experts from adding and subtracting them. See Howard, supra note
63, at 418.
75. The standard deduction also raises measurement problems. At present, only
itemizing taxpayers can claim the charitable deduction. If the standard deduction were
set at a lower rate, though, more taxpayers who donate would choose to itemize, which
implies that some portion of the standard deduction acts as a tax expenditure in support
of these marginal taxpayers’ gifts. See Brody, supra note 20, at 695 n.18.
A further source of methodological variation concerns whether
estimates are derived using a cash basis, which estimates the effects on
government cash flow, or an accrual basis, which estimates the tax liabilities
accruing to the government in a particular period. The United States uses
only a cash basis. Many OECD countries use only an accrual basis.73
Sixth, as the OMB ritually points out in its Analytical Perspectives
reports, even when applying the relatively straightforward revenue forgone
method, the overall revenue impact of a set of tax expenditures cannot be
determined through simple addition.74 Because tax expenditure policies
generate behavioral incentives and complex interdependencies, changes to
one policy may have first- and second-order consequences for other tax
expenditures and for the public fisc more generally. Were the charitable
deduction to be eliminated, to take just one example, the resultant decline in
private contributions would make the exclusion of interest income more
valuable if organizations responded by issuing more bonds, and it would put
pressure on the government to compensate for the shortfall.75
2. Income Effects
Even if one accepts the argument that the tax expenditure component
of private philanthropy represents a form of government spending, one could
still challenge the idea that the remaining portion is entirely private. This
challenge could be raised two main ways with respect to the charitable
deduction. First, as noted above, behavioral evidence suggests that charitable
giving is tax-price elastic, meaning itemizing taxpayers tend to pay out more
in donations than they would have paid out in taxes in the absence of a
deduction (a phenomenon referred to as “treasury efficiency”). The
discrepancy between these two sums, one might argue, ought to be credited
to the government. The outlay equivalent method does this; revenue forgone
does not. 
More important, one could argue that because the United States is a
relatively low-tax jurisdiction compared to its OECD counterparts, American
individuals and corporations are left with greater disposable income with
which to make donations. That is, in addition to the price effect of the
targeted subsidies that make donations less expensive for the donor, there is
an income effect caused by our low average tax rates that also deserves some
of the credit for motivating private philanthropy. The U.S. government is, in
this sense, underwriting even the donor who never claims a deduction.
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76. Roodman & Standley, supra note 10.
77. Id. at 20 tbl.8.
78. Id. at 20.
79. Id. at 32-35.
The most thorough analysis of this idea that I have seen appears in
a working paper by David Roodman and Scott Standley of the Center for
Global Development.76 Roodman and Standley calculate that this income
effect increases U.S. private charitable giving by 67%.77 They derive their
estimate by comparing the United States’ ratio of tax revenue to GDP against
that of Sweden, the OECD country with the highest such ratio, and by
assuming an income elasticity of 1.1.78 
Given the magnitude of this estimate, one might think it
fundamentally illegitimate to compare the tax expenditures of the United
States with the tax expenditures of a high-tax, high-ODA jurisdiction such
as Sweden (or, at least, to do so without controlling for income effects).
Maybe Swedes do not do much private giving because they know that part
of their heavy tax bill will go toward relatively generous government aid.
Maybe Americans do not agitate for greater government aid because they
know that as private individuals the nation is quite generous. Culturally, too,
Americans’ relatively low tax burden may be linked to its relatively robust
tradition of private philanthropy and decentralized charitable provision. 
This line of argument illuminates one risk of cross-country tax
expenditure comparisons and reinforces the need for a multifaceted approach
to evaluating foreign aid spending. But I do not think it undermines the value
of tax expenditure analysis in this context. Tax expenditures, and the price
effects they engender, are fundamentally different from income effects.
Income effects result from the basic structure of an income tax system and
apply categorically to all taxpayers within a given bracket; to call them an
aspect of foreign aid is to call everything the government does an aspect of
foreign aid. Tax expenditures, by contrast, represent an affirmative state
decision to favor a particular activity or class of taxpayers. Merely having a
low average tax rate does not generate private charitable giving with
anything like the purpose, immediacy, or symbolism of a charitable
deduction. And regardless, tax expenditures are a distinct form of
policymaking that deserves scrutiny on its own terms.
It may also be worth noting that the empirical evidence does not
support the view that either lower tax burdens or lower levels of official
foreign aid spending leads to higher levels of private charitable giving to
developing countries. Across the wealthy donor countries, Roodman and
Standley find, there is no significant correlation between tax/GDP ratios and
levels of private cross-border charitable giving, while there is a strong
positive correlation between the latter and levels of official foreign aid
spending.79
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80. Office of Mgmt. & Budget, supra note 22, at 296 tbl.19-3. These figures
include the revenue loss attributable to deductions for contributions to education and
health, which the OMB tallies separately.
81. Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Analytical Perspectives: Budget of the United
States Government, Fiscal Year 2002, at 93 tbl.5-6 (2001). This figure is shakier than
the income tax deduction figure both because it does not incorporate post-2001 policy
changes and because transfer tax deductions may have a somewhat weaker case for
being tax expenditures inasmuch as they shelter particular gifts or bequests from
taxation on the ground that these are not properly included in the tax base, rather than
to provide a separable tax benefit.
82. See Pozen, supra note 27, at 569-70 (reporting recent findings that 2.2%
of Americans’ giving goes to international affairs charities and suggesting that roughly
2% more heads overseas through other types of nonprofits).
83. See Roodman & Standley, supra note 10, at 6 tbl.1 (reporting DAC
statistics that U.S. nongovernmental organizations gave $6.3 billion to ODA-eligible
lower- or middle-income countries and $4.3 billion to higher-income countries in 2003).
84. Manning, supra note 1, at 172 tbl.8. This $16.3 billion figure was up from
$10.6 billion in 2000. Id.
B. A Rough Cut at the Numbers
Bracketing all of these caveats, casual empiricism can give us a
rough sense of the expenditure’s magnitude. Let’s start with the nonprofit
sector provisions. The most significant foreign aid tax expenditure is
occasioned by the charitable deduction. The OMB estimates that the total
revenue loss attributable to the federal income tax deduction will exceed
$324 billion over the next five years, or roughly $65 billion per year.80 The
annual revenue loss from the federal gift and estate tax deductions, according
to the OMB, had been running at roughly $5 billion before recent reforms.81
Not counting any of the state deductions, these figures suggest a total tax
expenditure of $70 billion per year on the charitable deduction. If we
estimate, conservatively, that 2% of U.S. donations head overseas – and
make no adjustment for the possibility that higher-bracket taxpayers are
more likely to support international causes – it would mean that around $1.4
billion of these funds is currently allocated to cross-border charity. Raise the
estimate to a more realistic 4%,82 and the figure would be $2.8 billion. These
numbers might be revised not only to reflect better data and various
approaches to the caveats listed above, but also to reflect different views on
whether and how to deduct administrative expenses or to include donations
that stay in the country but serve international purposes, such as donations
to a U.S. group that researches malaria prevention.
Apart from whatever incentive effects they might have had, federal
deduction expenditures of $2.8 billion would have accounted for roughly a
quarter of U.S. nonprofits’ total giving to developing countries in 2003,83 in
an amount equal to 17% of America’s ODA ($16.3 billion).84 Given that up
to 60% of U.S. nonprofits’ total cross-border spending has been going to
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85. See supra note 83.
86. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text (explaining the OECD’s
definition of ODA).
87. The charitable deduction expenditure is not skewed in this way. If
contributions to education and health were excluded, Treasury’s projection of the annual
revenue loss on the federal income tax deduction would come to approximately $53
billion per year over the next five years. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
88. See, e.g., Staff of Joint Comm. on Taxation, 109th Cong., Estimates as
Federal Tax Expenditures for Fiscal Years 2006-10 at 30-42 tbl.1; Office of Mgmt. &
Budget, supra note 22, at 287-90 tbl.19-1.
89. Evelyn Brody & Joseph J. Cordes, Tax Treatment of Nonprofit
Organizations: A Two-Edged Sword?, in Nonprofits and Government: Collaboration
and Conflict 141, 149, 150 & tbl.4.5 (Elizabeth T. Boris & C. Eugene Steuerle eds., 2d
ed. 2006).
90. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text. On the other hand, the
internationally focused organizations tend to be significantly more constrained in their
ability to generate fees for services or payments for goods than other types of nonprofits,
which limits their capacity to take advantage of the income tax exemption. See Pozen,
supra note 27, at 570-71. Evelyn Brody and Joseph Cordes found that in 2002, public
charities focused on “international affairs” garnered less than $50 million in income tax
savings from the exemption. Brody & Cordes, supra note 89, at 150 tbl.4.5. This finding
does not entail that the aid-related tax expenditure occasioned by the exemption must
have been this amount or lower, as many private foundations and many charities not
classified as international affairs entities do some amount of development work abroad.
these countries,85 approximately $1.68 billion of that sum could be a
candidate for “development assistance” classification.86
The other major nonprofit sector tax expenditures are tougher to
quantify and flow mainly to hospitals and universities,87 two types of
nonprofits unlikely to dispense much foreign charity (though some hospitals
run international programs, and certain university policies, such as
scholarships for international students and drug development for global
diseases, might be so characterized). For the exclusion of interest income, the
JCT and the OMB do not keep statistics beyond those for hospitals and
educational facilities.88 Enterprising tax scholars recently estimated the
annual state and federal aggregate expenditure on the income tax exemption
and the property tax exemption at $10.1 billion and $8 to $13 billion,
respectively.89 If even 1% of the lower bound of this sum ($18.1 billion) had
gone toward international development, it would represent an additional
$181 million in aid spending. The real figure could easily be double this:
recall that internationally focused charities and foundations currently make
up about 2% of the nonprofit sector, in numerical and revenue terms, and that
this proportion has been rising.90
The calculations just proffered are crude, and much more work must
be done to derive satisfactory estimates of, first, the total tax expenditure
allocated to the nonprofit sector and, second, the portion thereof allocated to
foreign causes deserving of the “aid” label. But the cocktail-napkin math
suggests that annual tax expenditures on foreign aid, as delivered through
private nonprofits and measured as revenue forgone, are currently running
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91. See supra Section I.B.
92. Office of Mgmt. & Budget, supra note 22, at 287 tbl.19-1.
93. Calculated from Jennifer L. Koncz & Daniel R.Yorgason, Bureau of Econ.
Analysis, Direct Investment Positions for 2005, at 33 tbl.1.2 (2006) (reporting estimates
of U.S. direct investment positions abroad on a historical-cost basis). This 18% estimate
is marginally on the high end, because where the table does not specify a particular
country (labeled “Other”), I assume the countries represented to be ODA-eligible. 
94. Over the past thirty years, U.S. companies have repatriated roughly half of
the after-tax income earned by their foreign subsidiaries, Council of Econ. Advisers,
Econ. Rep. of the President 209 (2003), and those companies and individuals located
in developing countries may choose to invest the income they earn there in other, richer
foreign countries, or nowhere at all.
somewhere in the range of $1.6 to $3.2 billion, of which as much as $2
billion might reasonably be deemed ODA.
Beyond the nonprofit sector provisions, what about the other U.S. tax
expenditures that might serve as foreign aid – the International Affairs
expenditures and the concessions granted to developing countries in bilateral
tax treaties? How much assistance do they provide? This calculation is even
more vexed. To my knowledge, the treaty concessions have never been
systematically compiled, much less tabulated; as a result, I cannot offer an
estimate of them here. The International Affairs tax expenditures have been
compiled and tabulated, but they suffer from the more basic problem that, by
the standards of the field, they do not deserve to be counted as aid.91
Taking these expenditures as a potential source of aid, though, how
much of their revenue cost is attributable to income earned in developing
countries? The OMB estimates the total revenue loss from the International
Affairs provisions over the next five years at approximately $110 billion, or
$22 billion per year.92 Bureau of Economic Affairs statistics indicate that as
of 2005 approximately 18% of U.S. FDI was located in lower- or middle-
income countries eligible for ODA receipt under OECD rules.93 Taking these
two figures together – the first as a proxy for the amount of money these tax
expenditures have freed up for investment abroad, the second as a proxy for
the percent of this money allocated to ODA-eligible jurisdictions – we arrive
at a figure of $4 billion. This is roughly the amount of money that American
individuals and corporations living or operating in developing countries
would have lost each year to taxes in the absence of the International Affairs
tax expenditures. It is not at all clear that these individuals and corporations
reinvest this entire sum in the source country where they earn it or in other
developing countries;94 for those who prefer to see the International Affairs
tax expenditures as a form of foreign assistance, four billion dollars might
be taken as an absolute upper bound of what they generate annually in
hidden aid. Even more so than with the nonprofit sector tax expenditures, my
numbers here are quite speculative and meant only to kickstart a
conversation.
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95. While commentators have described certain of the foreign-investment-
related tax expenditures noted in Section I.B as “foreign aid,” see supra notes 8-10 and
accompanying text, I have been unable to find any systematic analysis of these
expenditures’ role as aid. And I have been unable to find any sustained discussion
whatsoever of the nonprofit sector expenditures’ relationship to aid. The closest I have
seen appears in Roodman & Standley, supra note 10, in which the authors identify the
charitable deduction as a “de facto aid policy,” id. at 35, and thoughtfully explore its
incentive effects on private cross-border giving. Roodman and Standley do not,
however, identify this “aid” as a tax expenditure, try to quantify its revenue cost, address
possible implications of conceptualizing the deduction as aid, or consider the other
nonprofit tax privileges.
96. For an extreme statement of these difficulties, see Vjekoslav Bratić, Tax
Expenditures: A Theoretical Review, 30 Fin. Theory & Prac. 113 (2006) (arguing that
meaningful cross-country tax expenditure comparisons are impossible).
97. See International Aspects, supra note 18. Important international tax
expenditure studies from the years since include OECD Tax Expenditure Report, supra
note 18; and World Bank, supra note 18. Another useful template is offered by the
Center for Global Development’s Commitment to Development Index. See supra note
67 and accompanying text. The Index’s aid component, on which the United States
ranked third to last in 2006, includes both controls for aid quality and measures of
private giving attributable to tax incentives. See Ctr. for Global Dev., Commitment to
Development  Index  2006:  Aid  (2006),  available  at  http://www.cgdev.org/section/
initiatives/_active/cdi/_components/aid/.
III. WHY IT MATTERS
If one accepts the argument above, then government spending on
foreign aid is somewhat larger, and substantially different in character, than
most commentators seem to have realized.95 What to make of this insight is
a question large enough for a book; in this Part, I just try to sketch a few
implications. Section A recommends the inclusion of tax expenditures in
ODA accounting. Section B further explores the merits and effects of this
prescription. Section C offers a qualified defense of using tax expenditures
to finance foreign aid.
A. Redefining ODA
Perhaps the most obvious takeaway from the prior analysis is that the
OECD and the U.S. government should start to classify tax expenditures on
foreign aid as foreign aid, collect data thereon, and adjust their statistics
accordingly. Estimating these tax expenditures will not be easy, as explained
in Part II, and comparing them across countries will only increase the
difficulties, given differences in tax structures, measurement and reporting
methodologies, and expected behavioral responses.96 Yet tax expenditure
scholars have been developing templates for comparative analysis since at
least 1985,97 and the OECD has the competence and credibility to formulate
a reasonably reliable, if not entirely valid, methodology. As long as the
OECD methodology is transparent, it should greatly advance public
understanding of this form of aid.
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98. I am grateful to Simon Scott, Principal Administrator of the OECD
Development Cooperation Directorate’s Statistics and Monitoring Division, for bringing
my attention to this internal debate.
99. Dev. Cooperation Directorate, Org. for Econ. Cooperation & Dev., Possible
Changes in the Recording of ODA ¶ 9, at 4 (2002).
100. Id. ¶ 13, at 5. My own views on these considerations are that: yes, tax
exemptions for NGOs’ own operations should be counted as ODA, see supra Section
I.A; but no, taxes paid in the donor country on ODA activities should not be deducted
from ODA, for there is nothing punitive about these taxes and every tax dollar collected
on these activities is a dollar not counted toward tax expenditure aid. The presentational
and accounting considerations, meanwhile, could be addressed simply through better
data collection and reporting.
It turns out the OECD has in recent years considered – and rejected
– the proposal that it count certain charitable tax expenditures as ODA.98 At
present, the OECD measures aid spending only at the point of expenditure
from revenue and never at the point of tax collection, thus disregarding all
tax effects. A 2002 report remarks that “[i]nformal discussions suggest that
some Members might wish to change this so as to count as ODA the value
of deductions or rebates for private contributions to NGOs.”99 (No Member,
it seems, has ever raised the issue of counting additional tax expenditures as
ODA, which lends further support to the argument in Part II that only the
nonprofit sector expenditures have a reasonable conceptual claim to being
aid.) Apparently the reformers did not win out. If tax expenditures were to
be allowed as ODA, the report goes on to note, “the following considerations
would need to be addressed:”
• implications for measuring other flows: At present, the
taxation process is entirely excluded from DAC statistics. To
count tax deductions for contributions to NGOs would open
other tax-related questions, e.g. Should tax exemptions for
NGOs’ own operations also be ODA? Should sales tax
exemptions on aid inputs be ODA? On the other hand,
should tax paid in the donor country on ODA activities be
deducted from ODA: for example, the tax paid by aid agency
staff or consultants hired on ODA programme budgets, or
any taxes paid by aid sponsored students?
• presentational issues: NGOs might see extending ODA
eligibility to tax deductions as cheating, especially since
ODA claimed would have to be deducted in reporting their
own net outflows.
• accounting issues: Members that do not have a specific
line on tax returns devoted to contributions to developmental
NGOs will have no data on the amounts of revenue forgone
through these incentives.100
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101. Dev. Cooperation Directorate, Org. for Econ. Cooperation & Dev.,
Summary Record of the 53rd Meeting of the DAC Working Party on Statistics ¶¶ 50-53,
at 10-11 (2003). Spain adduced the following arguments in favor of counting these tax
expenditures as ODA:
1. Deductions stimulated private flows for development 
2. They suited Members that favoured low taxes, rather than raising
taxes to meet aid needs 
3. Recent changes to Spanish law on deductions involved a clear
sacrifice of revenue 
4. The Spanish Finance Ministry could readily calculate the sums
involved 
5. Although deductions were not flows, other non-flows still counted as
ODA.
Id. ¶ 50, at 10.
102. Id. ¶¶ 52-53, at 10-11.
103. Id. ¶ 53, at 11.
104. Id.
105. See Roodman & Standley, supra note 10, at 19-22 (finding U.S. tax
policies among the most potent at both subsidizing and stimulating private overseas
giving); see also supra note 27 (describing the comparative laxity of U.S. tax rules
concerning cross-border philanthropy).
106. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
107. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., supra note 3, ch. 6.
In a report issued the following year, the OECD names names: Spain
supported counting tax deductions for private contributions to developmental
NGOs as ODA; France and Italy were on the fence; Belgium, Norway, and
Switzerland opposed such a change.101 Surprisingly, the United States joined
ranks with this latter group.102 When Spain characterized the objections to its
proposal as merely technical, “[t]he United States disagreed, stating that the
underlying issue was a question of principle: namely, which flows were
official and which were private.”103 Given that the OECD Development
Assistance Committee already counts private flows separately, the United
States argued, there is no need to include tax incentives in ODA;
nongovernmental organizations, moreover, “would resent the intrusion into
them of the tentacles of government.”104 (How a purely definitional reform
would have subjected NGOs to these tentacles is not elaborated.) This was
a curious argument for the United States to make, considering that we have
for many years been a leader in tax incentives for foreign giving105 and a
laggard in official aid spending.106 Just one year previously, the State
Department had released a major report decrying ODA’s failure to capture
“the full measure of U.S. aid.”107
It is time to follow Spain’s lead. The Spanish OECD representative
was right: the considerations that would be raised by adding tax expenditure
aid to ODA are technical in nature. It is not necessary for the OECD to
address these considerations perfectly satisfactorily for this reform to make
ODA figures richer and more meaningful – and more favorable for the
United States. If the U.S. government has a principled concern to respect the
distinction between official aid and private aid, this concern actually cuts
668 Florida Tax Review [Vol. 8:6
108. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
109. See supra Section II.B.
110. I do not know of any statistics that specifically address the distribution of
taxpayer savings from cross-border charitable contributions. The claim above is
intuitive, however, given that some amount of disposable income is needed to make any
significant contribution; only itemizing taxpayers may claim a deduction; the size of the
deduction varies with the taxpayer’s marginal rate, meaning higher earners get to deduct
at higher rates; wealthier individuals have consistently polled as being more committed
to internationalism than the rest of America, Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, The
Limits of International Law 216 (2005); and several fantastically wealthy individuals
such as Bill Gates, Warren Buffett, and George Soros are known to have made massive
contributions to global philanthropy in recent years. Cf. supra note 32 and
accompanying text (discussing the work of the Gates Foundation).
against its position, not in favor of it: it is precisely because the government
is committed to the view that tax expenditures are a form of official spending
that Treasury must produce a tax expenditure budget each year. Tax
expenditures do not magically lose their governmental character when they
cross the border.
B. The Value of Proper Counting
1. General Relevance
The significance of changing the way we count and conceptualize
foreign aid is more than just academic. Incorporating tax expenditures into
this field can allow us to draw more meaningful comparisons with the aid
budgets of other countries; to clarify what exactly is governmental and what
is not in the pool of money that Americans collectively send abroad; and to
receive more credit for our overseas spending while undercutting Hudson
Institute-style claims that the United States is vastly more generous than it
has been portrayed.108 On several levels, then, tax expenditure analysis can
rationalize the debate on foreign aid. More ambitiously, keeping track of tax
expenditure aid can allow the government to coordinate its activities more
tightly with those of NGOs and to evaluate the allocation and impact of its
aid spending in a more holistic and useful framework. Each of the OECD
countries could benefit similarly. Both within and across the world’s donor
nations, adding tax expenditures to the official aid figures could help all
parties, public and private, to see more clearly what the others are doing and
to what effect.
Revising ODA to include “hidden foreign aid” may also have
implications for domestic tax policy debates, as it would enhance taxpayers’
ability to gauge the nature and magnitude of policy priorities embedded in
the Code. For example, the data suggest that the charitable contributions
deduction is our major engine of hidden foreign aid,109 and that much of this
aid comes from a small number of rich donors.110 Voters who come to
comprehend these features of the deduction might find them particularly
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111. See infra text accompanying notes 123-128 (suggesting potential
democratic and foreign policy objections to tax expenditure aid). 
112. I base this ratio on Treasury’s estimate that the deductibility of mortgage
interest on owner-occupied homes cost almost $80 billion in lost revenue in 2007,
Office of Mgmt. & Budget, supra note 22, at 292 tbl.19-2, and on my $2 billion upper-
bound estimate of the annual revenue forgone to charitable tax expenditures that might
qualify as ODA, see supra Section II.B.
113. I say “no organization” because I think it unrealistic that an individual
researcher would be able to collect and interpret this information, over time, in a
rigorous way. Language barriers alone pose a major obstacle. Again, the OECD is the
obvious body to be leading this data collection effort.
114. My tax expenditure aid calculations are based on Commonwealth of
Austl., Tax Expenditures Statement: 2005 (2005); Dep’t of Fin. Can., Tax Expenditures
and Evaluations: 2006 (2006); HM Revenue & Customs, Charities: Costs of Tax Relief
(2006), available at http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/stats/charities/table10-2.pdf; Office of
Mgmt. & Budget, Analytical Perspectives: Budget of the United States Government,
Fiscal Year 2005, at 287-89 tbl.18-1 (2004); and Tax Strategy Group, Ir. Dep’t of Fin.,
M a j o r  T a x  I n c e n t i v e s / E x p e n d i t u r e s  ( 2 0 0 6 ) ,  a v a i l a b l e  a t
http://www.finance.gov.ie/documents/tsg/2006/tg1905.pdf. I also use Brody & Cordes,
supra note 89, at 149-50, for the U.S. income tax exemption estimate, discounted to
elitist or undemocratic.111 This could lead to increased support for extending
the deduction to non-itemizers or otherwise making it more progressive, with
respect not only to cross-border giving but also to domestic giving. On the
other hand, voters would find that we have been spending around forty times
more on the mortgage interest deduction than on all tax expenditure aid
policies combined,112 which might temper any concerns about excessive
internationalism.
Unmasking hidden foreign aid can thus enrich the conversation on
tax policy as well as foreign aid policy, among the general public as well as
specialists. This reconceptualization can yield not only new descriptive
clarity but also, as I elaborate in the following Section (C), new normative
insights into the desirability of using tax incentives in this arena.
2. Statistical Relevance
But first, would this change in ODA reporting affect the United
States’ comparative aid performance? I cannot give a precise answer, both
because of the difficulties adumbrated in Part II and, more basically, because
no organization has compiled the relevant tax expenditure figures from donor
countries.113 It seems safe to say that the United States would rise on the
donor league table, given its relatively generous tax subsidies for charitable
giving and relatively minor constraints on their cross-border distribution. But
would we rise to any significant degree?
As the figures below indicate, the answer is no. Using data from the
governments of Australia, Canada, Ireland, the United Kingdom, and the
United States – OECD countries that regularly report their tax expenditures
in English – I present estimates of each country’s “tax expenditure aid,”
alongside the better-known ODA figures.114 The estimates are crude. They
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exclude state-level exemptions. The ODA data come from Manning, supra note 1, at 16
tbl.1.1.
In trying to construct a comparative table and to encourage the systematic
development and usage of more robust such tables in the future, my project is similar
to two prior efforts to uncover the “hidden” nature of U.S. government spending, via tax
expenditures, on a particular social issue: Christopher Howard’s treatise on the tax
privileges that make up America’s “hidden welfare state” and Michael Graetz and Jerry
Mashaw’s analysis of U.S. spending on social insurance. See Michael J. Graetz & Jerry
L. Mashaw, True Security: Rethinking American Social Insurance 299-303 (1999);
Christopher Howard, The Hidden Welfare State: Tax Expenditures and Social Policy
in the United States (1997). Professors Graetz and Mashaw found that once tax
expenditures are included, U.S. spending on social insurance as a proportion of GDP
rises from being at the bottom of the OECD ladder to being relatively close to most
other nations. Graetz & Mashaw, supra, at 302 fig.14.1.
115. See supra notes 82, 90 and accompanying text (examining this proportion
for the U.S. case).
represent 4% of the sum of all reported national-level tax expenditures,
measured as revenue forgone, that are targeted at nonprofit organizations.
(Any tax sparing credits used by the other countries are therefore not
captured.) Charitable contributions deductions and credits and income tax
exemptions are responsible for the vast majority of the sums. The estimates
are also generous. While the proportion will vary from country to country
and from year to year, it seems likely that 4% is at the high end of the
percentage of charitable tax expenditures that head to developing
countries.115 Still, these figures give a sense of how, even though the United
States provides more tax expenditure aid than any other country, this aid
amounts only to a small fraction of ODA. Its inclusion in ODA,
consequently, would do little to move the United States up in the rankings.
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116. See United Nations Dev. Programme, supra note 2, at 130 (summarizing
recent studies estimating that developing countries lose between $24 billion and $72
billion a year in agricultural income from the farm subsidies and other protectionist
policies of wealthy countries).
117. Numerous commentators have noted the hypocrisy of these subsidies, see,
e.g., Martin Wolf, Why Globalization Works 215-16 (2004); McDaniel, supra note 48,
at 279, though I have never seen anyone else consider this precise question. The Center
for Global Development penalizes rich countries for domestic farm subsidies in its
Commitment to Development Index, but only with respect to the countries’ trade rating,
not their aid rating. See Ctr. for Global Dev., Commitment to Development Index 2006:
Trade (2006), http://www.cgdev.org/section/initiatives/_active/cdi/_components/trade/.
Pushing this idea a little further, would counting foreign charity tax expenditures as
ODA strengthen the case for counting agricultural tax expenditures as illegal farm
subsidies under World Trade Organization rules? The U.S. government would
presumably be even more averse to drawing this inference. I am grateful to John
Colombo for suggesting this point.
3. Two Unpersuasive Objections
Separate from the technical complications involved in counting tax
expenditure aid, two further, more substantial arguments might be raised
against revising the definition of ODA along these lines. First, classifying
anything other than direct government spending as aid might be seen to start
us down a slippery definitional slope. If tax expenditures on foreign charity
should be added to the official figures, should tax expenditures (and U.S.
subsidies more broadly) on agriculture – expenditures known to have
devastating effects on developing-world farmers116 – be subtracted from the
figures?117 Although I believe that agricultural subsidies profoundly
undermine the United States’ good works in international development, I
would resist such a move, so as to preserve conceptual clarity. Development-
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118. Roodman & Standley, supra note 10, at 15.
119. Note in this regard that recent studies have found Americans, on average,
to believe that foreign aid accounts for 20% of the federal budget, around thirty times
the actual figure. Sachs, supra note 68, at 80.
120. See Manning, supra note 1, at 16 tbl.1.1.
121. See Shaviro, supra note 17, at 187.
degrading tax expenditures can be tallied on a separate list, as can military
spending and purely private contributions, and scrutinized just as intensively.
Whether and to what extent these activities complement or cancel out the
development-promoting tax expenditures is plainly a debatable proposition.
Practically and analytically, however, it is useful to preserve some bright
lines between foreign aid and all of the many other things rich countries do
that bear on the developing world’s welfare.
One could also raise a pragmatic argument for excluding tax
expenditures from the official aid figures. For those who want the U.S.
government to give much more, there is a risk that any upward revaluation
of its largesse will make Americans feel more confident in their generosity
and thus lead to complacency. (In stark contrast to the United States,
Sweden, the darling of the international development community, provides
zero tax subsidies for foreign charity.)118 Militating against this argument,
however, are both the demands of intellectual honesty and the equally
plausible prospect that, by stimulating increased attention to foreign aid, a
public conversation on tax expenditures will help Americans see just how
ungenerous their policies really are.119 
Adding two billion dollars to annual ODA would still leave the
United States far below its peers in proportional terms. Specifically, it would
have increased 2006 spending from 0.19% to 0.21% of GNI – less than half
the European Union’s unadjusted average and possibly insufficient to move
the United States out of last place in the OECD rankings.120 Even adding
twenty-two billion dollars to annual ODA would have increased 2006
spending only to 85% of the European Union total – and this without
crediting the EU countries with any tax expenditure aid of their own. In a
foreign aid debate so focused on perceptions of generosity, it is damaging
that the U.S. government does not receive full credit for its spending. But
full credit would not mean high marks.
C. For (and Against) Tax Expenditure Aid
Beyond simply acknowledging and keeping track of tax expenditures
on foreign aid, how might we begin to evaluate them as tools of legal and
public policy? One useful framework is offered by tax expenditure theory.
From its inception, this literature has had a clear prescriptive aim: to convert
most tax expenditures into direct expenditures or repeal them altogether.121
Following Stanley Surrey, critics have flagged a host of concerns. Tax
expenditures increase tax complexity and compliance burdens
(administrative concerns); they are more opaque and esoteric than direct
expenditures and so relatively more immunized from public debate or
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122. See, e.g., Surrey & McDaniel, supra note 4, chs. 3-4. As Christopher
Howard explains it, “[t]he consensus [in the tax literature] is that tax expenditures are
bad public policy: they are economically inefficient; they complicate the tax system;
their growth is uncontrollable; and, because they are rarely deliberated over or reviewed,
they lack the legitimacy of direct spending programs.” Howard, supra note 114, at 6.
Professor Surrey would have been gratified to hear Howard’s synopsis, one assumes,
but mortified at the utter failure of this academic consensus to beat back the growth of
tax expenditures.
123. See Pozen, supra note 27, at 573.
124. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., supra note 3, at 141 (discussing the
advantages of private organizations in financing foreign charity).
125. I have been unable to find a good estimate of the percentage of total U.S.
foreign aid spending allocated to these categories of recipient. However, the fact that the
U.S. Agency for International Development tracks its aid expenditures by recipient
country and region, see, e.g., U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., U.S. Overseas Loans and
Grants: Obligations and Loan Authorizations, July 1, 1945 – September 30, 2005
(2005), would appear to suggest a significant degree of coordination with foreign
governments. Out of $31.4 billion appropriated by Congress in fiscal year 2006 for
“international affairs” activities, the State Department and USAID together received
$1.6 billion for multilateral economic assistance meant to be passed on to international
institutions. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev. & U.S. Dep’t of State, Congressional Budget
Justification: Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year 2008, at 12, 154 (2007).
126. For empirical verification of this point, see Alberto Alesina & David
Dollar, Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?, 5 J. Econ. Growth 33 (2000).
scrutiny (visibility concerns); they are more likely than direct expenditures
to have regressive first-order effects (equity concerns); their uses may evolve
in unexpected ways (predictability concerns); and they may stimulate
unproductive activity or reward behavior that would have occurred anyway
(efficiency concerns).122
At first glance, tax expenditures on foreign aid appear to exaggerate
each of these defects. Most obviously, their transnational character raises
special problems of oversight and transparency. Voters will find it tougher
to perceive these expenditures; officials will find it tougher to monitor them
to make sure they reach their intended beneficiaries (and instead do not
support, say, private inurement or other noncharitable activities). Given that
wealthier Americans have consistently polled as being more committed to
internationalism, savings from the charitable deduction may be even more
concentrated among this group when cross-border giving is concerned.123
With foreign aid, there is an especially acute tension between the value of
fostering “pluralism, volunteerism, and compassion”124 through preferential
treatment of the nonprofit sector, and the potential to save money and pursue
a unitary policy vision through centralized planning and administration. Tax
expenditures are much less likely than direct expenditures, one assumes, to
be allocated to foreign governments or public international institutions such
as the World Bank125 – bodies that are uniquely equipped to implement large-
scale projects and reforms. Whereas traditional ODA will inevitably reflect
the government’s political and strategic goals,126 a decentralized patchwork
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127. See Pozen, supra note 27, at 597-99 (describing this tension yet defending
deductibility for cross-border gifts that may contravene executive branch policies such
as the “global gag rule”). Tax expenditures on foreign aid, like tax expenditures on
domestic charity, may also in some cases conflict with each other, as when two
nongovernmental donees use their tax expenditure funding to pursue rival social-change
strategies. The potential for this type of intra-tax-expenditure offset raises efficiency
concerns more than democratic or foreign policy concerns.
128. See Peter Dobkin Hall, A Historical Overview of the Private Nonprofit
Sector, in The Nonprofit Sector: A Research Handbook 3, 19 (Walter W. Powell ed.,
1987).
129. In a previous paper, I argued at length for allowing (and indeed
strengthening) deductions for cross-border charitable donations. Pozen, supra note 27,
at 574-601. Readers interested in a more extended discussion of the arguments in the
surrounding paragraphs, from the perspective of charitable deduction theory, may wish
to consult that source.
130. See Graetz & Mashaw, supra note 114, at 301 (discussing the “benign
political status” of tax expenditures, which are widely viewed as decreasing the size of
government even though direct spending toward the same ends would be viewed as
increasing the size of government).
131. See Roodman & Standley, supra note 10, at 34-35.
132. But see Peroni, supra note 9, at 297 n.4 (“In a democratic society, the fact
that using the tax system to provide aid to developing countries is less transparent and,
therefore, more politically palatable is not a reason to favor such use. Rather, the
of tax expenditures may serve very different objectives – missionary
agendas, for instance – and even contrary objectives.127 
These features of tax expenditures on foreign aid raise problems not
only of administration, visibility, vertical equity, targeting, and efficacy, but
also, one could argue, of democratic legitimacy. They conjure up the old
notion, dating back to the World War II era, of the nonprofit sector as a locus
of liberal internationalism, disconnected from, if not downright opposed to,
the U.S. national interest.128
Yet at the same time, tax expenditures on foreign aid possess some
distinctive virtues not captured by standard tax expenditure analysis.129 Most
fundamentally, they diversify aid spending and increase the total amount of
aid. There is little reason to think that they crowd out explicit government
giving when their uses are so unpredictable, voters often fail to identify tax
expenditures with direct outlays,130 and no relevant officials appear to have
noted them. Across the wealthiest countries, moreover, the empirical
evidence suggests that private and public cross-border giving are not
substitutes but complements: countries that have high per-capita levels of net
aid transfers tend to have high levels of private overseas donations as well.131
Private and public cross-border giving should also be complements in a
functional sense to the extent that the two sets of recipients pursue nonrival
goals. For those who want the United States to give more foreign assistance
– either as a moral or strategic matter or because they believe that
democratic-process pathologies are responsible for the present low levels of
ODA – the relative opacity of tax expenditures may therefore seem
innocuous, if not a good thing.132
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contrary is true – the lack of transparency of tax expenditure programs is one of the
reasons to disfavor their use.”).
133. Cf. Kane, supra note 9, at 927 (“[E]ven if one views foreign aid strictly
in strategic terms, it is quite plausible that, given current levels of public
misinformation, legislators are essentially precluded from delivering an optimal amount
of aid.”); Saul Levmore, Taxes as Ballots, 65 U. Chi. L. Rev. 387, 428-30 (1998)
(suggesting that foreign aid appropriations might be a good area in which to use a “taxes
as ballots” taxpayer checkoff strategy, given the perceived electoral cost to politicians
who vote for increased aid and the strong likelihood that Congress is susceptible to
cycling preferences with respect to these appropriations). But cf. Fleming, Jr. et al.,
supra note 9, at 346 (arguing that “a tax expenditure scheme [for economic-
development-related foreign aid] should not be substituted for the direct aid program
unless the tax expenditure plan allows the kinds of nuanced distinctions between
candidate countries that would be features of a direct aid program”). Although focused
on a different group of tax expenditures, Christopher Howard has demonstrated that the
politics of tax expenditures differ markedly from the politics of regular tax and budget
items, across a wide range of dimensions. See Howard, supra note 114, ch. 9.
Even if U.S. charitable tax expenditures can help correct for certain
governmental failures concerning foreign aid, it is possible that these expenditures might
play a role in exacerbating a different form of governmental failure: the near-
pathological inability to undertake fundamental tax reform. By placating particular
interest groups and classes of voters, some scholars have argued, tax expenditures can
undercut momentum for systemic change. See, e.g., Michael J. Graetz, 100 Million
Unnecessary Returns: A Fresh Start for the U.S. Tax System, 112 Yale L.J. 261, 273-76
(2002). While I take this concern seriously, the political economy of foreign aid tax
expenditures does not seem to fit this pattern, on account of their general absence from
the conversation on tax policy and the relatively diffuse, politically powerless nature of
their ultimate beneficiaries abroad. 
134. See Pozen, supra note 27, at 572, 592-93. Because foreign aid tax
expenditures have these public good characteristics, it is possible that even a diehard
isolationist, concerned only with the welfare of compatriots, could find reason to
embrace them. See id. at 579-87, 593. But most Americans are not diehard isolationists;
in assessing a given tax policy, most will care to at least some extent how it affects
people in other countries. Although I cannot prove this, it also seems likely that
Americans will tend to be particularly universalistic when assessing policies that
These expenditures, furthermore, help develop both the U.S.
nonprofit sector and global civil society. The expenditures serve an educative
function by connecting more Americans, via the beneficiary nonprofits, to
issues and events around the world. They empower certain minority views
in foreign policymaking and invigorate the “market” in development
strategies. They cordon off one segment of the aid budget from the
vicissitudes of constituent politics and thereby help correct for possible
governmental failures, such as a tendency to underserve populations or
causes that lack a domestic lobby and to underweight long-term threats.133
Because a large amount of Americans’ foreign giving goes toward issues of
economic development, environmental protection, health, and human rights,
these tax expenditures often end up supporting causes that are both morally
compelling and well-suited to generate positive interspatial externalities that,
over time, may redound to the benefit of the United States.134 Although
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concern charity. Moral arguments for helping others do not stop easily at the national
border.
135. Although corruption in the developing world “is an emerging priority for
the international community” and is the subject of many new reform initiatives, Susan
Rose-Ackerman, Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and Reform 177
(1999), it has long plagued foreign aid provision. See Eric A. Posner, International Law:
A Welfarist Approach, 73 U. Chi. L. Rev. 487, 531 (2006) (“It is widely agreed that
much – perhaps most – foreign aid has been squandered because it has been confiscated
by donee governments, lost to corruption, or misused in some way.”). 
136. This is assuming, of course, that there is merit to having aid at all. I
believe this, and most informed observers seem to believe this, but there exists a
significant corps of dissenters. See, e.g., supra note 52 and accompanying text
(identifying William Easterly as a leading foreign aid skeptic); see also Evan Osborne,
Rethinking Foreign Aid, 22 Cato J. 297, 314 (2002) (asserting that development
assistance “is at best a distraction and quite possibly harmful in terms of promoting
prosperity”); Posner, supra note 13 (analogizing foreign aid to domestic welfare
provision and stating that “[m]y own, unfashionable view is that charitable giving, both
governmental and private, is more likely to increase than to alleviate the poverty, ill
health, and other miseries of the recipient populations”).
137. See Jack Goldsmith, Liberal Democracy and Cosmopolitan Duty, 55 Stan.
L. Rev. 1667, 1670-75 (2003) (summarizing the philosophical literature on “plausibility
constraints” that make cosmopolitan moral duties too demanding for individuals and
more appropriately assigned to institutions); see also Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Bridging
the North/South Divide: International Redistribution and Tax Competition, 26 Mich. J.
Int’l L. 371, 372-74 (2004) (arguing that legislators’ incentives, localist sentiment, and
the concern that aid dollars will be misspent together make it unlikely that rich
democracies will substantially increase foreign aid spending or implement globally
redistributive taxes in the foreseeable future).
private international contributions may be especially difficult to monitor and
the public bodies typically bypassed by tax expenditure aid may have greater
scope and authority to foster development, nongovernmental grantmakers
and recipients may nevertheless be more effective because of their relative
freedom from political and bureaucratic constraints and, often, corruption.135
Pluralism in foreign aid financing need not conflict with, and may even
better support, fiscal accountability, economic efficiency, and U.S. national
welfare.
This point-counterpoint contains many contestable (and rarely
addressed) empirical and normative claims. It could be elaborated,
formalized, and assessed any number of ways. Developing an appraisal of
these tax expenditures is by no means straightforward; there is clear merit to
having both centralized aid and decentralized aid,136 and striking the optimal
balance between them will never be an exact science. Yet given America’s
comparatively paltry levels of ODA, the transnational public good
characteristics of much foreign charity, and the well-known limitations –
intuitionistic, psychological, biological, practical – on individuals’ capacity
to show moral regard for distant strangers,137 I submit that tax expenditures
serve a valuable function in institutionalizing and expanding our
commitment to foreign charity. The analysis above shows that on
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138. Consider some examples. Congress might decree that charitable donations
that wind up abroad will receive a lesser deduction, or no deduction at all. This would
create both investigative difficulties, because regulators would need to figure out which
parts of which gifts have crossed the border, and civil liberties concerns, because this
oversight would require the tracking and sorting of all deductible gifts over time. More
basically, it would skew donors’ incentives away from international causes (even more
so than the requirement of a U.S.-based intermediate donee already does). Congress
might, instead, deny deductions or exemptions to organizations with overseas operations
that it deems excessively large or liable to conflict with foreign policy goals. This would
not only decimate the internationally focused component of the U.S. nonprofit sector;
it would also require controversial line-drawing as to which organizations would be
covered. Pick another example if you do not like these. All such “decoupling” reforms
would compromise the nonprofit sector’s autonomy because the current tax rules respect
this autonomy so fully: as long as an organization is found to be legitimately charitable
(and non-political) in nature, the deduction and the exemptions are made available to
it without any inquiry whatsoever into the precise purpose, quality, or location of its
work.
139. Thomas W. Pogge, An Egalitarian Law of Peoples, 23 Phil. & Pub. Aff.
195, 201 (1994); see also Thomas W. Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights:
Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and Reforms ch. 8 (2002) (expanding on this idea, now
dubbed a “Global Resources Dividend”). Representative expressions of support for
Pogge’s proposal include Martha C. Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice: Disability,
Nationality, Species Membership 320 (2006); Kok-Chor Tan, Justice Without Borders:
Cosmopolitanism, Nationalism, and Patriotism 80-81, 94-95, 159 (2004); Edward B.
Foley, The Elusive Quest for Global Justice, 66 Fordham L. Rev. 249, 258-60 (1997);
and Will Kymlicka, Territorial Boundaries: A Liberal Egalitarian Perspective, in
Boundaries and Justice: Diverse Ethical Perspectives 249, 271 (David Miller & Sohail
H. Hashimi eds., 2001). For an excellent dissenting view, see Joseph Heath, Rawls on
consequentialist, moral, and political-process grounds, the use of tax
expenditures on foreign aid is at least defensible.
Sweden probably does have a more targeted, consistent, and efficient
aid program, but in a society as large and heterogeneous (and skeptical of big
government) as the United States, a more pluralistic, mixed-funding
approach may be appropriate. And regardless, transitioning to a unified aid
budget would be extremely costly. There is no way to decouple the tax
expenditures on nonprofits’ foreign activities from the tax expenditures on
their domestic activities without upending the current system of tax
preferences and severely compromising the autonomy of the nonprofit
sector.138
To see just how subtle America’s tax expenditures on foreign aid are,
an interesting comparison might be drawn with the globally redistributive
taxes that cosmopolitan political theorists have recently been advocating.
Many of these theorists have endorsed Thomas Pogge’s proposal for a
“global resources tax,” a 1% consumption tax on all natural resources the
proceeds of which would be “used toward the emancipation of the present
and future global poor.”139 In the same vein, numerous academics and
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(Daniel Weinstock ed., 2007).
140. See Paulette L. Stenzel, Why and How the World Trade Organization
Must Promote Environmental Protection, 13 Duke Envtl. L. & Pol’y F. 1, 40 (2002)
(“Support for the Tobin tax, which was first proposed about thirty years ago, is growing
around the world.”); Ctr. for Envtl. Econ. Dev., Tobin Tax Initiative,
http://www.ceedweb.org/iirp/ (last visited Apr. 12, 2007) (providing links to Tobin tax
campaigns and publications). Prominent academic endorsements include Tan, supra note
139, at 80-81, 94-95; and Michael Walzer, Governing the Globe: What Is the Best We
Can Do?, Dissent, Fall 2000, at 44, 52. A related line of activism, also heating up as of
late, has been pushing for the creation of a worldwide taxing authority. See Ned Shelton,
Interpretation and Application of Tax Treaties § 9.8, at 535 (2004) (“The idea of a world
tax body has been mooted quite seriously in recent years, in particular since the Zedillo
Report in 2001. The idea is gaining momentum . . . .”). The actual creation of any such
authority, however, still seems highly unlikely to materialize in the near future. See
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the
Welfare State, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 1573, 1649 (2000).
141. Graetz, supra note 37, at 11.
development organizations have endorsed some version of a redistributive
“Tobin tax,” an excise tax on cross-border currency transactions the proceeds
of which would likewise be devoted to the world’s poor.140 Global taxes such
as these would in many respects be the inverse of our tax expenditures on
foreign aid: they would be highly visible, administered by a central
international body, purposefully and unabashedly redistributive, subject to
ceaseless intergovernmental politicking, and coordinated to the last decimal
point with other countries. 
Both functionally and symbolically, tax expenditures have much less
capacity than global taxes to effectuate development ideals. Politically and
programmatically, however, tax expenditures are nowhere near as demanding
or as disruptive of the existing economic order. As Michael Graetz notes,
“[t]he idea that international tax policy should be used to redistribute income
internationally . . . certainly has not become a widely accepted norm” in the
tax community.141 For those who would like to see greater international
redistribution, the beauty of the foreign aid tax expenditures is that, for many
years, they have been used for just this purpose – without provoking much
controversy or even much notice that they are, in fact, a form of international
tax policy.
I should be clear, though, that the argument here is meant only as a
qualified defense of foreign aid tax expenditures, in two senses. First, I do
not mean to suggest that these tax expenditures are a preferable or adequate
substitute for direct aid. Compared with these expenditures, direct aid
spending has greater scope to produce growth and redistribution, can be
coordinated and monitored more effectively, can take advantage of
economies of scale and non-public information, carries more expressive and
symbolic force, and has a more obvious democratic pedigree. I believe that
the tax expenditures identified in Section I.A are similar enough to direct aid
expenditures in substance and procedure that they should be recognized as
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142. Cf. supra note 133 (discussing, in the second paragraph, the concern that
tax expenditure growth has undercut momentum for fundamental tax reform).
143. See Pozen, supra note 27, at 595-96 (recommending possible reforms to
facilitate greater international deductibility).
foreign aid; that does not mean they are interchangeable with conventional
ODA. 
Second, I do not mean to imply that our foreign aid tax expenditures
are perfect as is. Given the background conditions against which they are
operating – widespread use of tax expenditures to address a seemingly
endless array of social problems,142 notoriously low official aid spending,
massive global need – I think it is better that they exist than that they not
exist. But it is possible that any number of reforms, including fairly radical
ones such as replacing the charitable deduction with refundable credits,
would have greater virtues in the realm of foreign aid. Indeed, it would be
surprising if our current system of tax expenditures turned out to be ideally
structured to generate and channel foreign aid activities, considering that no
one has been talking about these policies in foreign aid terms.
CONCLUSION
This Article has tried to suggest a new way to think about the
relationship between tax policy and foreign aid policy. While previous
commentators have referred to certain tax measures aimed at promoting
extraterritorial investment as “foreign aid,” I made the case that only tax
subsidies aimed at the nonprofit sector have a good claim to this title. Within
this set of subsidies, I then offered a preliminary methodology for appraising
how much should qualify as ODA, and a rough estimate of the current figure.
This descriptive analysis can, I hope, shed new light on the debate over how
foreign aid can and should be financed and administered. Finally, I argued
that the OECD should include tax expenditure aid in its definition of ODA,
I explained what differences this reform would make, and I offered a
normative defense of the United States’ use of this form of aid. Although tax
expenditures generally, and cross-border tax expenditures in particular, may
raise a number of problems, I tried to show how these policies can serve as
useful complements to our ODA program.
Readers unconvinced by this cursory defense of tax expenditures on
foreign aid need not be too alarmed. If these expenditures are politically safe
from radical retrenchment, they are constrained from radical expansion for
a more basic, structural reason: they are not scalable like regular
expenditures. Although further internationalization of the nonprofit sector
should keep driving up the subsidies, by design they will never be more than
fractional supplements to private charity. Nonprofit organizations cannot
realistically benefit any more from exemptions because they already pay
nothing, in most jurisdictions, in mission-related income, property, sales, or
franchise taxes. The charitable deduction might be extended to nonitemizers
and to direct cross-border gifts,143 but if individual and corporate donors were
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to receive significantly more generous tax breaks – on top of what are
already the most generous such policies in the world – it could undermine the
deduction’s popular support, if not the tax base itself. And it would be a
political nonstarter, not to mention a communitarian nightmare, to provide
stronger incentives for foreign giving than for domestic giving.
For those who seek a Jeffrey Sachs-style foreign aid revolution in
which the United States delivers on its Monterrey Consensus pledge,144 it
would therefore be a mistake to see tax expenditures as a possible panacea.
Tax expenditures are destined to be a limited, though important, vehicle for
addressing the world’s most urgent problems.
